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| 1 |
ID:
156686
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, biological weapons issues have repeatedly been raised by Russian officials and state-controlled media. Considering that biological weapons development and the use thereof are banned by international law, to insinuate that another state is engaged in activities with offensive signatures is politically sensitive. What are the underlying motives for raising these issues? Is Russia using anti-American propaganda in the biosecurity arena as a tool to discredit the United States for general political reasons, or is it used as a means for internal purposes to motivate increased funding for advanced biodefense research and development? A need for additional funding is also in line with views of the Russian military and security doctrines where the threat from biological weapons is explicitly addressed. Russian discrediting is related to the US support of biosafety/biosecurity upgrades at biological laboratories in the former Soviet republics. This Russian stance toward the United States was also reflected in the run-up to the 8th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 2016, supported by statements of officials indicating that Russia is threatened by US activities in the biological weapons area. This type of unsubstantiated accusations has not been helpful when attempts were badly needed to make progress in the BTWC context. Russian disinformation campaigns, in relation to biological weapons and possible underlying causes, are presented and discussed.
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| 2 |
ID:
156689
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| Summary/Abstract |
The eastern parts of Yugoslavia were the site of savage fighting between October and December 1944, as the German Army Group E tried to force its way out of an almost desperate situation it had found itself in following the evacuation of Greece. Against all odds, this huge German formation managed to best three Allied armies, rugged terrain, and autumn rains and reach the relative safety of the Independent State of Croatia, where it joined the remainder of the Axis front in the Balkans. Although this dramatic episode had been extensively written about in the former Yugoslavia and Germany, it received next to no attention in the English-speaking academic community. The article at hand will provide an overview and an analysis of military operations based on a wide plethora of primary and secondary sources of all sides. It will also argue that the ultimate success of the breakthrough was as much due to the unwillingness of the Soviet high command to devote more resources to the Balkan Front, and the structural weaknesses of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Partisans’ armies, as it was to the battlefield prowess of the Wehrmacht.
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| 3 |
ID:
156685
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article traces the discourse shaping nuclear weapons decision making in Russia. An examination of publicly available sources of communication by influential Russian actors reveals a clustering of dominant nuclear propositions. Utilizing narrative frame analysis, this article uncovers five narratives circulating the conversations of Russian policy elites: ‘Strategic Instability’, ‘Cold War Reruns’, ‘Conditional Arms Control’, ‘Broken Promises’, and ‘Nuclear Resurgence’. Narrative frame analysis supports the understanding of the strategic context and includes assessing risks associated with strategies from one’s own and, in this case, Russia’s perspective. Possessing an understanding of the specific narrative dynamics equips American representatives to better navigate complex and challenging dialogues with their Russian counterparts. Further, this narrative typography better postures national security strategies in the context of a multi-polar nuclear world to lower the risk of nuclear war.
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| 4 |
ID:
156684
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| Summary/Abstract |
Among the changing characteristics of nuclear deterrence in the 21st century, compared to the first nuclear age that preceded it, is the relationship between nuclear weapons and cyber war. It might be supposed that nuclear weapons, the ultimate weapons for mass destruction, and cyber conflicts, involving nonlethal and precisely targeted attacks on information systems and computer networks, would be polar opposites on the menu of military means. On the other hand, there is the potential for cyber attacks to be employed against command-control systems that enable nuclear weapons to perform their assigned missions. In addition, information warfare might be used during a nuclear crisis to mislead the opponent about another state’s intentions or capabilities.
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| 5 |
ID:
156687
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article addresses the sphere of performing arts as part of Russia’s security policy and, in particular, its propaganda dimensions. The authors approach cultural representations as appeals to universal norms rather than to national interests and in this respect focus on two specific cases of aestheticization of military force applied beyond the national borders of the Russian Federation — in Georgia in August 2008 and in Syria since September 2015. These cases are comparable with each other, since the external projections of Russia’s hard power were accompanied by similar cultural gestures — namely, public concerts of classical music performed by the world-famous Valery Gergiev’s Mariinsky Theater in two sites controlled by Russian troops, Tskhinvali and Palmyra. The article argues that the Russian government uses two strategies of aestheticizing its military missions — mimetic (implying the closest possible correspondence to reality) and aesthetic (based on imageries), though the distinction between the two is not always well fixed.
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| 6 |
ID:
156688
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| Summary/Abstract |
During World War II the Soviet Union received large amounts of aid from the Western world in the form of supplies and military intervention, both of which were declared to have been irrelevant for the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany by Soviet historians. This article examines the claim made by Soviet historiography, and it comes to the conclusion that both Western supplies and military intervention were far more helpful than claimed by the Soviets. Without this aid the Red Army would not have been able to perform as well as it did historically, tilting the balance in Germany’s favor. Soviet claims about the irrelevance of Western aid can thus be dismissed as propaganda and inaccurate.
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