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ID:
164708
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| Summary/Abstract |
Analyzing Russia’s VOSTOK 2018 strategic level field-exercise (or “strategic manoeuvers”) in the West from a Western perspective is hard. A key reason for this is that Western and Russian perspectives on war and the use of military force have grown apart. By this, Russia is still focused on traditional notions of mass, i.e. massed troops and firepower brought to bear on the enemy to achieve tactical/operational victory. Conversely, most Western states have turned their thinking to effect precision engagement, using high-tech situational awareness and C4 capabilities with small(er), professional and highly lethal forces. For the last 25 years, much of the Western focus on warfare has highlighted force-protection and the avoidance of collateral damage in expeditionary operations that have little to do with vital national security interests. This deviates completely from the Russian perspective: causing maximal casualties and destruction in order to prevail in the battlefield (to wit: observe Eastern Ukraine). In short, today the very expensive Western precision warfare meets attrition warfare and decisive battles would enjoin to produce the ultimate use of violence.
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| 2 |
ID:
164706
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russian military prefers and exercises differently compare to the Western planning and execution philosophies with mission command allowed and appreciated in sub unit levels only. “Vostok-2018” provided a lot of evidences Russians using de-centralised execution in the sub-unit levels and at the same time centralised control at levels of units and formations.
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| 3 |
ID:
164705
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| Summary/Abstract |
The latest Russian strategic level field-exercise, VOSTOK-2018, grew notorious with its officially reported overwhelming numbers of participating troops, pieces of equipment moved, units maneuvered, and even the states involved – China was in, too! Nonetheless, this exercise again raises an important point that has not registered in most analyses, i.e. the rarely asked question if Russians are at all capable of, or willing to, apply free-play in the conduct of the field-exercise, instead of their infamous highly-scripted military exercises, designed to impress the VIP visitors, rather than train troops and grow commanders.
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