| Summary/Abstract |
Nearly six years after the onset of international intervention in 2013, the security situation in Mali continues to deteriorate. Despite a plethora of security sector assistance initiatives, the Malian army is struggling to become a more effective fighting force. This article analyses security sector assistance by describing local responses to international intervention. Based on original research in Bamako and dozens of interviews with Malian army officers and foreign advisers, diplomats and defence officials it traces the mutual perceptions of interveners and their Malian interlocutors. The author shows that both sides hold often diverging views of the analysis of the problem (a weak army), their respective roles, as well as the appropriate modalities and strategies of army reconstruction. While interveners routinely bemoan a lack of local ownership, Malians are exasperated by what they depict as the invasive and paternalistic behaviour of external actors who negate the existence of Malian expertise and agency. The dissonance triggers forms of subtle resistance against externally-driven reform that undermines cooperation. Yet, strong mutual interests in the perpetuation of cooperation imply that Mali and its international backers are locked into a dysfunctional partnership that none of the two sides has an incentive to leave.
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