| Summary/Abstract |
The article looks at the legacy of consociationalism in Lebanon with the aim of illuminating some insights on the linkages between power-sharing and conflict resolution in the post-2011 Middle East. It highlights three core dilemmas or governance traps that have recurred in Lebanon’s political dynamic: the power-sharing formula’s proneness to deadlock, its dependence on the external environment as an avenue for partisanship and sectarian leverage, and its weak responsiveness to demands from below. The article shows how these dilemmas are tightly linked to the politics of sectarianism. While Lebanon’s postwar transition (1990 onward) serves as a backdrop for exploring these dilemmas, emphasis is placed on the performance of Lebanon’s political system in the post–Arab Spring era. The aim is to assess whether Lebanon’s consociational performance has matured over time. The Lebanese experience brings into sharper focus the limitations of sectarian power-sharing. Still, it provides useful insights for reshaping the debate on power-sharing in divided societies of the Arab world.
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