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| 1 |
ID:
185977
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| Summary/Abstract |
The literature on South Korean elections has shown that voters’ region, ideology, and generation shape their preferences at the polls. Few studies, however, have investigated the long-term effects of these variables or the difference in the effects of ideology and generation between regions. In this article, we generate theoretical expectations of Korean voters’ voting behavior, analyzing cleavage structures in the party system since democratization, and we then examine the interactive effects of region with ideology and generation across voters from Gyeongsang and Jeolla, in six presidential elections from 1992 to 2017. We find that ideology and generation have stronger effects among Gyeongsang voters than among Jeolla voters. To be specific, ideology and generation often divide Gyeongsang voters, especially when the Democratic Party nominates a presidential candidate from Gyeongsang; Jeolla voters are more homogeneous in their support for the party, regardless of their ideology and generation.
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| 2 |
ID:
165229
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| Summary/Abstract |
The common assumption of legislative politics is that the majority party structures procedural rules to suit its interests. In a presidentialized context, however, presidential electoral incentives prevail over majority party's incentives when voting on procedural rules changes and the threat of punishing majority-party defectors is not credible when those defectors vote with the presidential candidate. To test these claims, I analyze the case of the procedural reform in the South Korean National Assembly. The case study reveals that 1) the leading presidential candidate of the ruling majority Saenuri Party compromised on the procedural reform bill that imposes restrictions on the majority party's cartel arrangement due to presidential electoral incentives; 2) a significant number of Saenuri Party members defected from the majority of their co-partisans to vote with the presidential candidate; and 3) career advancement ratio and re-nomination ratios demonstrate that those defectors were not punished afterwards.
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