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SHARAN GREWAL
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
172540
From Islamists to Muslim Democrats: the Case of Tunisia’s Ennahda
/ Grewal, Sharan
Sharan Grewal
Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract
What drives some Islamists to become “Muslim Democrats,” downplaying religion and accepting secular democracy? This article hypothesizes that one channel of ideological change is migration to secular democracies. Drawing on an ideal point analysis of parliamentary votes from the Tunisian Islamist movement Ennahda, I find that MPs who had lived in secular democracies held more liberal voting records than their counterparts who had lived only in Tunisia. In particular, they were more likely to defend freedom of conscience and to vote against enshrining Islamic law in the constitution. Interviews with several of these MPs demonstrate that they recognize a causal effect of their experiences abroad on their ideologies, and provide support for three distinct mechanisms by which this effect may have occurred: socialization, intergroup contact, and political learning.
Key Words
Islamists to Muslim Democrats
;
Case of Tunisia’s Ennahda
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2
ID:
165263
How to Sell a Coup: Elections as Coup Legitimation
/ Grewal, Sharan
Sharan Grewal
Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract
Unlike other political leaders, leaders coming to power through military coups face a dual legitimation challenge: they must justify not only why they should rule but also how they came to power. Little attention has been paid to how coup leaders solve this legitimacy deficit and even less to the audiences of this legitimation. We ask: why do some coup leaders legitimate their coups by holding elections while others do not? Counterintuitively, we argue that coup leaders who oust democratically elected leaders are less likely to hold elections, except when tied to US military aid. We test these hypotheses through a data set of military coup regimes from 1946 to 2014 and trace out mechanisms through case studies of the Nigerian coup of 1983 and the Egyptian coup of 2013. This argument provides a new explanation for the emergence of authoritarian elections and a new perspective on the international dimensions of dictatorship.
Key Words
Foreign Aid
;
Elections
;
Legitimacy
;
Democratic Institutions
;
Civil–Military Relations
;
Political Survival
;
Coups
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