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ID:
165269
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article illustrates China’s counter-terrorism strategy at the United Nations (UN), analyses its cornerstones and underscores changing patterns. On this basis, it also seeks to make some broader observations about how rising powers behave in international organisations and to highlight their attitudes towards the liberal international order. It considers Chinese positions in the debates in the General Assembly (1972–2018), its Sixth Committee and the Security Council (since the early 1990s) and identifies four pillars of China’s counter-terrorism strategy. These include norm entrepreneurship, diplomatic measures, promotion of international cooperation and domestic measures to fulfil obligations emanating from UN resolutions, conventions and declarations. It shows how China has shaped the discourse on terrorism at the UN and how its counter-terror narratives and advocacy have been and are being shaped by the discourse among states and competing blocs like the Organization of Islamic Conference over this period. It concludes with the observation that, despite changes in its strategy in recent years, the defining principles of China’s counter-terrorism strategy, such as respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, have not eroded. Changes like accepting that the UN must play a ‘central coordination role’ in international counter-terrorism should be regarded as a further extension of China’s zeal to maintain the international order because the UN is a defining pillar of the present international order.
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| 2 |
ID:
192106
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| Summary/Abstract |
Between 2014 and 2019, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders conducted an internal debate over whether to continue prioritizing economic development as the Party’s most important policy priority or whether to consider security equally as important. The debate has concluded as of 2020, and the CCP has embraced a new guiding principle that elevates security alongside development as a key policy focus. The CCP appears to have determined it can assert itself on a broad range of issues beyond those permitted by the ‘development-first’ approach it maintained since 2002, even at cost to economic growth. Following its new policy determination, the Chinese government’s behavior will be harder to shape using only tools that primarily threaten Chinese economic performance.
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