Search Result

Srl

Item

ID: 165347

Autocracies and economic sanctions: the divergent impact of authoritarian regime type on sanctions success / Peksen, Dursun

Peksen, Dursun	Journal Article
	0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)

Summary/Abstract

There is some consensus in the literature that economic sanctions targeting authoritarian regimes are less effective than those against democratic regimes. This line of research, however, assumes that autocratic regimes are monolithic and that they have similar capacities to resist foreign pressure. This study argues that the success rate of sanctions against dictatorships is contingent on institutional differences across different types of autocracies. I develop a theoretical model indicating that single-party and military regimes are less likely to concede to foreign pressure compared to democracies. This is because they effectively use various repressive tactics and positive inducements to endure the costs of the coercion. Sanctions against personalist regimes, on the other hand, are likely to be as effective as sanctions directed at democracies. Personalist regimes might be inclined to acquiesce to foreign pressure due to their lack of strong institutional capacity to weather the costs of the sanctions. Results from the selection-corrected models show that sanctions against military or single-party regimes are less likely to induce concessions relative to democratic target regimes. The findings also indicate that there is no significant difference in the success rate of sanctions against personalist regimes and democratic governments.

Key Words

Authoritarianism ; Economic Sanctions ; Regime Type ; Sanctions Success

Links

'Full Text'

In Basket

Export

ID: 192054

Constraining Compliance? Reconsidering the Effect of Veto Players on Sanctions Success / Corda, Tiziana

Corda, Tiziana	Journal Article
	0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)

Summary/Abstract

What effect do domestic political and institutional constraints such as veto players have on the success of international sanctions which their countries have been subjected to? Do they facilitate or constrain compliance with them? Although in the literature on sanctions success the role of domestic factors has received extensive attention, a typically public-policy concept such as veto players has remained largely underexplored. The potential of its application to the literature on sanctions was only recently uncovered by sanction scholars who found empirical support for the hypothesis that the larger the size of veto players in a country under sanctions, the higher the probability of compliance. Contrary to their findings, this article theorises a negative causal mechanism whereby a growing divergence in the relevant policy-area preferences of veto players prevents the targeted country from complying with sanctions-related demands. An empirical reassessment of this relationship with George Tsebelis’ original policy-area-specific veto player data confirms this negative effect.

Key Words

Economic Sanctions ; Political Institutions ; Veto Players ; Foreign Policy ; Sanctions Success

Links

'Full Text'

In Basket

Export