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ID:
186265
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| Summary/Abstract |
KURT WEYLAND examines the weaknesses of populist leadership. He argues that populist leaders are prone to errors and misdeeds, have difficulty dealing with other political forces, and face institutional and external constraints. Consequently, he concludes, they damage and suffocate democracy not as easily and frequently as recent observers have feared.
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| 2 |
ID:
165511
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| Summary/Abstract |
External referee letters can, in principle, provide essential inputs for tenure and promotion decisions. But scholars’ reluctance to prepare critical, not to speak of “negative” assessments has led to a skewed self-selection: Potential referees tend to accept the task only if they see a tenure or promotion case as worthy of support. The resulting overabundance of praise has devalued the content of referee reports; they are difficult to interpret and of limited use for distinguishing deserving from undeserving candidates. Maybe a simple reform can mitigate these problems: Departments should pay external referees a generous honorarium, perhaps up to $2,000 at well-endowed research universities. This substantial incentive will induce more scholars to provide these assessments, thus counterbalancing the current self-selection on candidate supportability. Moreover, a large honorarium clearly turns the commissioning department into the contractual “principal” of these assessments, leading referees to prepare more searching, balanced evaluations. The main criterion will be whether a promotion really improves the department’s academic quality and scholarly standing.
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