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ID:
188024
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| Summary/Abstract |
Gendarmerie forces are actively deployed by many states in the world to fight terrorism, but their impact on terrorism has not been explored. This study fills this gap in the literature and examines the effect that having gendarmerie forces has on terrorist activities in a state. I discuss competing arguments about the relationship between having these forces and terror incidents and also address the conditioning effect of bureaucratic capacity on this relationship. By constructing a time series cross-sectional data that identifies the countries having gendarmeries in given years, I test these arguments, and the results of the empirical analyses suggest that states having gendarmerie forces experience more terrorist violence than those without gendarmeries. However, the number of terror incidents in states with gendarmeries decreases as these states have greater bureaucratic capacity. The results have implications in terms of the role of militarized policing on terrorism and countering terrorism.
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| 2 |
ID:
165677
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the forces that encourage targets and challengers involved in claim disputes to offer concessions first. Our framework focuses upon reputation and pressure as key forces that can influence concession-making by claim dispute targets and challengers. We argue that past concession behavior both inside and outside of a claim dyad influences the willingness to make concessions, but does so in distinct ways. We also argue that pressure arising from internal conflict within the disputants and from major power involvement in managing the dispute, also influences the occurrence of concession-making. The results of our hazard analysis show that states involved in claim disputes do consider their opponent’s previous concession-making behavior. Our findings point clearly to the history of concessions within the dyad as a key influence on subsequent concession-making and that major power involvement increases the likelihood of concession-making by both challengers and targets.
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| 3 |
ID:
188710
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| Summary/Abstract |
What explains the role of restraints on military for limiting victimisation of civilians? We find that a higher number of officers trained on counterinsurgency are associated with a lower number of civilians killed by government forces in civil wars. We also find that the number of civilians killed by government forces reduces as the degree of military involvement in politics reduces, and as the judiciary becomes independent. These results suggest that if the goal is to curb indiscriminate civilian killings, better training in counterinsurgency, the existence of judicial checks, and lowering military influence in politics are practical policy tools.
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| 4 |
ID:
188052
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| Summary/Abstract |
While existing research on terrorist group termination examines numerous factors explaining why some terror groups end their campaigns of violence, these studies do not sufficiently address the impact that the actors who actively fight these groups have on the probability of a group’s demise. This paper explores the effect of gendarmeries on terrorist group termination. Gendarmeries may either contribute positively to the counterterrorism efforts of the state with their policing and military operations, or they may undermine these efforts to the extent that they become unaccountable to the state for their actions. Lax accountability may lead to principle-agent problems, resulting in an increase in the risk of those groups engaging in repressive or rent-seeking actions, which can undermine support for the government and contribute to the survival of the terror group. It is argued that the competing ways in which gendarmeries can affect counterterrorism efforts are conditioned by the bureaucratic effectiveness of the state in managing the activities of gendarmerie forces and by the state’s commitment to upholding the rule of law. The results of empirical analyses reveal that having gendarmeries increases a terrorist group’s chance of ending their campaign of violence but decreases the likelihood of a group’s demise in states marked by lower bureaucratic effectiveness and weak rule of law.
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