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ID:
183160
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| Summary/Abstract |
How best to understand South Korea’s engagement policy towards North Korea? Has it been interpreted correctly and untainted by the current political cleavage between different ideological blocs? Given that Kim Dae-jung, the South Korean president from 1998 to 2003, is widely regarded as the archetype of the engagement policy, this analysis re-evaluates his approach by examining his presidential speeches where three concepts emerge from a critical discourse analysis: securitisation, globalisation, and humanisation. This analysis argues that when it comes to evaluating this engagement policy, these concepts need greater comprehensive consideration. This analysis not only shows the necessity of synchronic policy analysis, it also offers an opportunity to reflect diachronically on the ways in which Kim’s engagement discourse was later adopted by politicians across the political spectrum that deal with North Korea. This is important to consider because his discourse continues to shape the inter-Korean negotiation process.
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| 2 |
ID:
165868
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the fact that the Korean nuclear crisis is one of the most protracted security issues in the world, the research analysing the crisis from the perspective of securitisation theory is curiously absent. This article attempts to pin down some distinguishing features of South Korea’s securitisation of the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, thereby investigating why one rarely sees the implications of securitisation theory in the way that the Copenhagen School theorists would suggest. Borrowing the key components of securitisation theory—existential threats, referent objects and extraordinary measures—this article suggests three elusive characteristics of the South Korean actors’ speech acts as sources highlighting the dilemma. To make the article’s arguments clearer, I hold Floyd’s classification of securitisation theory, which separated the securitisation process into two different stages: securitising move and security practice. While acknowledging the importance of the differences between illocution and perlocution in a securitisation process, this article takes this logic one step further by suggesting the limits of the perlocutionary effect in making the securitisation process complete.
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