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ID:
165099
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| Summary/Abstract |
How states employ coercion to achieve a position of advantage relative to their rivals is changing. Cyber operations have become a modern manifestation of political warfare. This paper provides a portrait of how a leading cyber actor, Russia, uses the digital domain to disrupt, spy, and degrade. The case illustrates the changing character of power and coercion in the twenty-first century. As a contribution to this special issue on twenty-first century military strategy, the findings suggest new forms of competition short of war.
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| 2 |
ID:
165098
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the increased use of military force in peacekeeping operations in the twenty-first century, these operations are not included in traditional strategic theory. In this article, I outline the logic of four strategies for peacekeeping operations – defence, deterrence, compellence and offence – and trace the use of these strategies in two consecutive UN operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUC and MONUSCO. The article concludes that all four strategies are indeed used in the two operations, but they are neither comprehensive nor proactive, leaving the true potential of military strategy unrealised.
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| 3 |
ID:
165096
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| Summary/Abstract |
This special issue explores military strategy in the twenty-first century. The articles scrutinise strategy from three perspectives: the study of strategy, and how our understanding of strategy has changed over time; new areas for strategic theory, i.e., areas where the development of war has made strategy become more important, such as peacekeeping operations and cyberspace; and the makers of strategy, more specifically why states choses suboptimal strategies and how wars in the twenty-first century influence strategy makers.
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| 4 |
ID:
165100
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| Summary/Abstract |
A constructive and effective interaction between politicians and their military advisers is an essential element in the successful conduct of strategy. The author draws on his own experience at the political-military interface and the operational level to argue that the political-military relationship is inherently problematic and that it has become increasingly so in the twenty-first century in the United Kingdom, partly due to changes in the character of conflict, but also due to an erosion of trust between political decision-makers and their senior military advisers. The article concludes that certain approaches need to be taken to resolve these challenges.
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| 5 |
ID:
165097
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| Summary/Abstract |
The practice of strategy is different from strategic theory. The latter was largely developed by professional soldiers from the experiences of the Napoleonic Wars, and compared the present with the past to establish general truths about war. It used history as its dominant discipline until 1945. The advent of nuclear weapons made history seem less relevant, and prompted the inclusion of other disciplines; deterrence theory also made strategic theory more abstract and distant from the practice of war. Since 9/11, the experience of war has forced strategy to become less theoretical and to do better in reconciling theory with practice.
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| 6 |
ID:
165101
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States has repeatedly intervened militarily in situations where tactical success on the battlefield did not translate into meaningful political resolution of the issues triggering the introduction of military force. Although US military interventions are hardly a recent phenomenon, a series of systemic, political and institutional developments over the past several decades have been particularly conducive to the limited use of force as a policy option. These factors have reduced the costs and risks of military intervention, incentivising the use of force in situations when it may not be the optimal policy response.
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| 7 |
ID:
165102
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this article, we develop the strategic rationale behind weak party escalation against stronger adversaries. There are, we suggest, four main strategies: to provoke a desired over-reaction from the stronger adversary; to compartmentalize conflict within a domain in which the weak party has advantages; to carve a niche with a stronger ally, and to forge a reputation of not yielding lightly. Spelling out these different logics contributes to the literature on small state strategies and escalation. It also suggests, contrary to much of the existing literature, that it can be rational for weak parties to escalate against great powers.
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