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| 1 |
ID:
163424
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 1998 housing reforms in Chinese cities have played a substantial role in setting social transition in motion. Not only has it produced an urban middle class of homeowners but it has also powerfully patternized collective mobilization. Fieldwork conducted in Shanghai reveals that homeowner communities living in ‘commercialized apartments’ (CAs) versus ‘government-sold apartments’ (GSAs) undertake distinct types of collective action. CA owners contentiously defend their rights and interests, whereas GSA owners remain compliant and lobby for welfare subsidies. This distinction in collective mobilizations between homeowners seems to originate in the distinct sources of homeownership. The logic of state capitalism underlies CAs and that of socialist patriarchy underlies GSAs. Analyzing a couple of mobilization episodes, the authors, by theory of contentious politics, focus on exploring the crucial mechanisms in the process of mobilization to explain why in the different settings the similar mechanisms have produced different outcomes.
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| 2 |
ID:
163426
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Previous scholarship has identified an emerging consensus for ethnic-policy reform in China, in the direction of strengthening national integration and a ‘melting pot.’ This article identifies three major contending schools in Chinese debates about the country’s ethnic governance: liberal autonomists, integrationists and socialist autonomists. It argues that the socialist autonomists, who oppose the ‘melting pot,’ have prevailed politically. Contention among the three schools, specifically, revolves around tradeoffs between autonomy and ethnic particularism. That is, compromised autonomy but preferential policies. The liberal autonomists reject the tradeoffs because of the cost to autonomy. The integrationists reject the tradeoffs because of the divisive role of ethnic particularism. The socialist autonomists, however, embrace the tradeoffs because of the developmental and distributional benefits. With the leftward turn of the Xi Jinping regime, they have prevailed ideologically and politically to safeguard the current system from any fundamental change.
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| 3 |
ID:
163425
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| Summary/Abstract |
Urbanization in China involves administrative conversion of rural counties into urban districts. During the 1990s, provincial governments enhanced the authority of county governments by building more direct linkages between the two levels. Yet prefecture-level cities retained direct administrative authority over counties on certain issues. Based on fieldwork and an original database of administrative reorganization cases from 2011 to 2016, the authors observe that vertical competition between provinces and prefecture-level cities is mediating, and in some cases, thwarting the latter’s urbanization efforts. Contrary to the expectation that more developed localities will incorporate wealthier counties, provincial capitals and less developed localities are incorporating counties with the highest fiscal revenue. In developing this argument, this article highlights the neglected role of the provincial government in administrative reorganization and the fiscal implications of urbanization.
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| 4 |
ID:
163428
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| Summary/Abstract |
Studies on peasant resistance in China have been typically associated with antagonistic actions against the state. This article examines a new form of peasant resistance nested in interactions between peasants and a non-governmental organization (NGO). Through the lens of a post-earthquake reconstruction programme in which peasants cannot be simply regarded as subordinates or a powerless group, it offers an alternative view on theories of ‘rightful resistance’ and ‘everyday forms of resistance’. With rural relations become more complex, the authors argue that contextually sensitive analyses which include multilateral interactions are needed for more in-depth understanding of diverse peasant resistance in contemporary China.
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| 5 |
ID:
163412
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article traces the process of Xi Jinping’s campaign in 2012–2017 and explains how an anticorruption effort has been transformed into an exercise of power-consolidation for his office. The findings of this article are three-fold. First, the power-consolidation process has benefited from a combination of an ideological campaign and a disciplinary campaign, which were not only synchronized but also feed into one another to achieve a shared goal. Second, the campaign became politicized around midterm and intensified afterwards. The pace of progress of the campaign coincided with Xi Jinping’s advancement of power. Third, the most significant outcome of Xi Jinping’s campaign is not the numbers of disciplined corrupt officials but the paradigm-change in the disciplinary regime of the Party: first, the reversal of the depoliticization process of the Party’s disciplinary regime; second, the retention of temporarily mobilized anticorruption resources; and third the simplification of evidence production procedure. The combined result is a considerable expansion of the CCDI’s anticorruption investigative capacities and a significant increase Xi Jinping’s leverage to impose political loyalty and compliance upon Party officials in the future.
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| 6 |
ID:
163420
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article attempts to discover whether the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s law-making body, is becoming more specialized and thereby losing its rubber-stamp image. The exploration of the composition of the NPC’s permanent committees demonstrates that specialization is indeed a discernible trend. More and more social elites have been co-opted onto them. The empirical results further attest to the usefulness of the information efficiency theory. Unfortunately, specialization has yet to give the Chinese legislature more autonomy. Only 30% of committee members are privileged to serve more than one five-year term. The influence of the Party-state core and the lack of membership stability have put additional restraints on the NPC’s autonomy.
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| 7 |
ID:
163427
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A key feature of Asia’s evolving strategic landscape is U.S. efforts to promote policy coordination and interoperability among its allies and partners, through dialogues, exercises, intelligence-sharing agreements, and other means. Though useful in addressing practical issues and underscoring shared values, a concern is that these ‘minilateral’ activities could exacerbate Chinese fears of ‘encirclement’ and lead to strategic or economic counter-moves. However, this article suggests that a new ‘security dilemma’ in Asia is not likely. Although Chinese officials and analysts are apprehensive about U.S. bilateral alliance developments, they have largely discounted the emergence of an ‘Asian NATO’ under U.S. stewardship. This is due to perceived divergences between U.S. allies, many states’ economic dependence on China, and U.S. self-restraint. This should open possibilities for greater minilateral cooperation under most conditions.
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| 8 |
ID:
163409
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Chinese foreign policy and the conduct of China’s diplomacy have undergone tremendous transformation under Xi Jinping’s leadership since 2012. How can scholars explain the foreign policy transformation under Xi Jinping? As Chinese power rises fast, do the new power status and the changing balance of power lead to the foreign policy change, or does the more confident leadership play the ‘game changer’ role? The author argues that international structural changes alone cannot explain the foreign policy shift, and Xi Jinping’s leadership has played a key role in transforming Chinese foreign policy since 2012, elevating it to a new height of ‘major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics,’ a brand name for the transformed Chinese foreign policy. Xi’s leadership role not only affects the redefinition of the vision and mission of Chinese diplomacy, but also leads to institutional restructuring of Chinese foreign and security policy apparatus.
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| 9 |
ID:
163411
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| Summary/Abstract |
In five years, Xi Jinping transformed both domestic and external policies of China to become the only leader after Deng Xiaoping to radically alter internal political landscape and external relations during his first term in office. Chinese leaders from Mao down tended to render foreign policy to a role of a second fiddle in their overall scheme of governing. Xi, however, for reasons that will be explored in this article, has shown determination and confidence to recast this traditional delineation in favor of a more integrated approach. In doing so, Xi has managed to pursue a far more assertive diplomacy. To help understand how Xi managed to carry out his brand of “major country diplomacy” (大國外交), the article uses a modified model based on Joel Migdal’s state capacity theory. Through a largely populist and nationalist ideology wrapped in globalist rhetoric, institutional revamp and innovation, mobilization of resources, implementation with discipline, risk-taking but skillful leadership while taking advantage of “world historical timing,” Xi was able to build a much stronger diplomatic capacity. However, Xi’s “major country diplomacy” is not without problems and challenges. The prospect of China becoming a true global power is far from certain.
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| 10 |
ID:
163410
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s diplomacy has undergone a sea of changes under Xi Jinping’s rein. But there is no consensus on the nature, scope, essence and direction of these changes. This article aims to explore both the changes and continuities in Chinese foreign affairs under the Xi Jinping leadership through the lens of his recently much-advocated formulation of ‘major country diplomacy with distinctive Chinese features’. Tracing the evolution, manifestation and causes of Xi’s ‘major country diplomacy’, it is argued that Xi’s diplomacy is a clear departure from Deng Xiaoping’s TGYH ([Tao Guang Yang Hui] low profile) strategy and therefore transformative in nature. On the other hand, however, his strong adherence to the core realist assumptions about national security issues makes his idealistic and liberal global vision and his efforts to transcend ‘the traditional Western theories of international relations’ more difficult to accomplish. In this respect, the glass is still half full and half empty.
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