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ID:
166095
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the evolution of legal strategies that the central government has used in managing Hong Kong affairs in the past three decades. It demonstrates that the Beijing government appears to have successfully employed the tactic of “legalisation without democratisation” to neutralise political resistance, to resolve thorny issues, and to stifle pro-independence voices. However, as Beijing’s legal strategies for Hong Kong have become more hands-on and assertive, the flaws and instrumentalism of Chinese-style “rule of law” have become increasingly salient, giving rise to deepening conflicts with the Hong Kong common law system. Legalisation without democratisation has given rise to a worrying trend of rising authoritarian legalism in Hong Kong.
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| 2 |
ID:
185962
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article is the first to systematically study and compare the criminal repression of civic NGOs under the rule of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. The crackdown is analyzed against the evolution of NGO governance strategy that has bifurcated into co-option and repression. Under Xi’s administration, the mode of repression has escalated from hooligan-style intimidation to law-based systematic crackdown, facilitated by an increasingly authoritarian legality. Underlying this escalation is the paradigm shift of governance strategy from ‘maintaining stability’ to ‘consolidating state security.’ Consequently, NGOs with evident pro-liberal inclination, mass mobilization capacities, and/or closer associations with ‘hostile forces’ are most vulnerable to persecution. This article concludes by gauging the impact of the crackdown on advocacy NGOs and suggesting possible scenarios for future rights activism.
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| 3 |
ID:
190968
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| Summary/Abstract |
The central–local structure is a unique perspective for both China’s constitutional law and party-state structure. However, the conventional approach to this issue pays great attention to its structural framework. This paper takes a unique approach to the functionality of local government guidance funds, an increasingly frequently used method for local governments to implement national projects like Made in China 2025. The project has been one of the several controversies between the United States and China in their ongoing trade confrontation. Built upon an analysis of paradigms in central–local relations, this paper further investigates the rule of law movement at the level of local government, an often ignored and under-discussed aspect of China’s central–local structure. The tentative conclusion is that the use of local government guidance funds facilitates local competition and promotes the rule of law.
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