|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
187908
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
China's land finance system has been a key contributor to the country's “economic miracle” over recent decades. While there is much existing research on different components of the land finance system, this paper, based on both an academic literature review and data analysis, provides an integrated understanding of how these parts function in tandem around the pivotal role of profitability in the system. First, we summarize the essentials of China's land finance system by providing a framework to understand the self-reinforcing cycle between local governments' financing and spending activities based on urban land-use rights (LURs). We also quantify the magnitude of profits generated by the cycle and its contribution to China's urban development. Second, we investigate the institutional underpinnings of the system, which empower local governments as the monopoly supplier of urban LURs. We also document the rising temporal trend in land prices in most cities. Both these institutional and market factors facilitate the profitability of land finance. Finally, we shed light on the sustainability of the system. Local governments' strong incentives to maximize the profitability of land finance have resulted in increasing economic and social costs/risks. Meanwhile, the feasibility of the system increasingly is coming into question, as both ongoing institutional reforms and recent urban land market cooling raise potentially fundamental challenges to the profitability of land finance.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
192547
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The rise of China and the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative have intensified regional great power competition. Seemingly, China and Japan have been competing over the export of infrastructure projects and access to the Southeast Asian market. Against this backdrop, this paper sheds light on recipient states’ agency. Specifically, this paper explores how Indonesia has responded to Sino-Japanese competition through the perspective of economic hedging. In the realm of domestic railway development and the need to establish connectivity on Java, why did the Indonesian government decide to work with China to develop the Jakarta-Bandung High-speed Rail project and Japan on the North Java Upgrading Line, as the two lines are not interoperable? Railway policy in Indonesia is strategic and pragmatic. On the one hand, Sino-Japanese competition diversifies Indonesia’s options as it continues striving to strengthen infrastructure development. On the other hand, the need continually to strike a balance between the two great powers requires skill and flexibility. Therefore, maintaining policy autonomy and accepting economic costs make-up secondary states’ responses to great power competition in turbulent times.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
166695
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This paper’s main aim is to contribute to the debate on the impact of China’s rise on the established norms and practices in the field of international development. To do so, it zooms in on a single infrastructure project, the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail line, which involved intense competition between China and Japan. Specifically, it examines how competition between China, a non-Western emerging power, and Japan, an OECD member, led to a recalibration of both China and Japan’s approaches to infrastructure financing in the region. The findings suggest that rather than straight convergence or competition between diverging models, there is an ongoing process of two-way adjustment between China, and representatives of the dominant global norms and practices. We also argue that to understand the implications of China’s participation in the field of international development, and its impact on the ‘rules of the game’ of global governance, researchers should avoid positioning inquiries within the premises of China’s one-directional impact on the development assistance regime. Rather, it is necessary to take into account a complex set of relationships including China, host countries and other ‘socialised’ actors, and the process of negotiation between them.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
171151
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
After Asian financial crisis, the Japanese government quickly adjusted its foreign economic policy and, unlike their traditional image of inaction, actively carried out and led the crisis rescue work through separate policies. The introduction and implementation of the “New Miyazawa Initiative” represented that the focus of the Japanese government has shifted to the preparation for and construction of the regional local currency bond market. This was backed by the strategic consideration to restart yen internationalization (or yen re-internationalization). It reflects the Japanese government’s reflection and adjustment on the path selection of promoting the internationalization of yen in the early stage. Relying on such change, The Japanese government intended to foster regional yen bond market to build yen backflow mechanism in East Asia and to realize the long-term objective of yen internationalization through “regionalization.” On the twentieth anniversary of Asian financial crisis, this paper re-examines the change to yen internationalization strategy, which is of practical significance for other cases’ attempt to internationalize local currencies as RMB internationalization at present. With reference to the strategic change in yen Re-internationalization, RMB internationalization shall shift the focus from “trade settlement” in the past to “capital outflow” through fostering the regional RMB bond market, expand RMB backflow mechanism. China shall focus on Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and other new regional financial cooperation platforms to promote RMB regionalization, thus finally realizing the strategic objective of RMB internationalization. Nevertheless, this path selection is inseparable from China’s positive attitude toward financial and capital liberalization.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|