| Summary/Abstract |
In many ways the “practice turn” in international relations (IR) was a mere “practices turn,” in that it essentially sidelined what were presumably two key inspirations of this “turn,” namely the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and American pragmatism. This article argues that—despite obvious differences—Wittgenstein and pragmatism share a general commitment to the primacy of practice and the constitution of meaningful action in language that reaches well beyond the ongoing fixation on “practices” (as habits) in IR. We argue that a combination of the central insights of both Wittgensteinian and pragmatist works offers a fruitful new perspective on the long-standing debate about whether the idea and practice of social science differ from other scientific disciplines, in particular natural science, in (a) the relation to its subject matter, (b) the methodology it applies, and (c) the role of theory. A reassessment of this debate will also broaden our understanding of the practice of IR theorizing that not only comprehends it as the mere habitual or routinized endeavor of social scientists bound to their specific method of science but also emphasizes the creative momentum of theorizing as a linguistic practice vis-à-vis its subject matter.
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