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| 1 |
ID:
163722
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| Summary/Abstract |
An experimental study was conducted to test whether the version of the structured analytical method Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) taught by the Cabinet Office to the United Kingdom’s intelligence community provides effective mitigation of the cognitive biases of serial position effects and confirmation bias in an intelligence analysis. ACH had no statistically significant mitigative impact on the proportion of participants that exhibited serial position effects or confirmation bias, or the impact of confirmation bias on the analytical process. The most significant factor that influenced participants’ judgements of the credibility of information was the possibility of deception or dishonesty.
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| 2 |
ID:
163726
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| Summary/Abstract |
During World War II, members of the Imperial Japanese Army biological warfare Unit 731 conducted a live test deployment of plague-infected fleas in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, China. The deployment triggered an outbreak involving 165 cases in downtown Ningbo, 112 of which were fatal (68% case fatality rate). Despite lack of access to effective medical countermeasures, the Ningbo community exhibited a high degree of social cohesion and resilience in the context of effective public health response. These findings support the value of community preparedness and strong public health infrastructure to mitigate the impact of biological weapons.
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| 3 |
ID:
163719
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‘Illegals’ are extensively trained individuals dispatched abroad under false identities with no observable links to their operating country. Technology has made possible a new kind of ‘virtual illegal,’ one that extends beyond the operating country’s borders without putting a human at risk. When this is done in a targeted manner by a sophisticated attacker it is called an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). This article draws from historical illegals cases to identify parallels in the preparation, insertion, and control of malware by APTs. Ultimately, the methods for countering the two parallel phenomena can also be similar, despite their physical differences.
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| 4 |
ID:
163727
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This article examines inter-allied efforts to collect, categorize and analyse material gathered from the thousands of German prisoners of war (POWs) in their hands during the Second World War. The different information gathered from enemy captives was valuable to British, Canadian and American intelligence services, helping them to evaluate morale of ‘Hitler’s soldiers’, to improve the security of their camp networks and to understand National Socialism ideology. Often viewed as a primarily British-American operation, POW intelligence also involved Canadian authorities. This article argues that Canada, far from being a secondary actor, had a central role within this transatlantic network.
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| 5 |
ID:
163721
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In the wake of 9/11 and the war in Iraq, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence adopted Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 – a list of analytic tradecraft standards – and appointed an ombudsman charged with monitoring their implementation. In this paper, we identify three assumptions behind ICD203: (1) tradecraft standards can be employed consistently; (2) tradecraft standards sufficiently capture the key elements of good reasoning; and (3) good reasoning leads to more accurate judgments. We then report on two controlled experiments that uncover operational constraints in the reliable application of the ICD203 criteria for the assessment of intelligence products.
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| 6 |
ID:
163725
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| Summary/Abstract |
From 1932 to 1945, Imperial Japan secretly developed the largest state biological warfare (BW) programme of its time, which was unique in its use of biological weapons in warfare and in its inhumane experiments on captive Chinese civilians. After Japan’s surrender, US military intelligence teams searched for any evidence of BW activities, whilst sharing all it could find with its close partner, the UK. Despite the UK offering little intelligence material in return, it secured detailed US intelligence reports on Japanese BW war crimes, and colluded with the United States to keep these Japanese war crimes a secret.
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| 7 |
ID:
163716
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines how effectively Britain secured its diplomatic communications against hostile decryption during the early Cold War. It shows that between 1945 and 1970 the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office introduced and operated four advanced cipher machines, Typex, Rockex, Noreen and Alvis, which produced very strong ciphers. However, Britain did suffer physical compromises of Rockex through Soviet espionage and an attack on the British embassy in Beijing. Rockex was also vulnerable to technical surveillance of its acoustic and Tempest emissions, and the Soviets exploited this to read the encrypted communications of the British embassy in Moscow.
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| 8 |
ID:
163723
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article will offer an assessment on the effectiveness of clandestine operations conducted by the German military intelligence service, the Abwehr, against the British colony of Gibraltar during the Second World War. This assessment is based on declassified British archival records, and this paper will argue that while the Abwehr had complex networks which attempted operations against the British at Gibraltar the Germans actually achieved little meaningful success. This article will reason that the inability to achieve any significant results was due to ineffective leadership and direction from Abwehr officers who also oversaw inadequate agent recruitment and training which impaired Abwehr clandestine operations.
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| 9 |
ID:
163717
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explains a US initiative to prepare resistance forces for use in the event of a Soviet invasion or communist attempt to seize power in Iran during the early Cold War era. It begins by discussing similar ‘stay-behind’ operations in Europe in this era and the conditions that led US officials to develop one in Iran. It then explains what this stay-behind operation consisted of and why US officials eventually abandoned it. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the stay-behind operation in Iran differed from those in Europe and the important role it played in the decision-making that led to the 1953 coup in Iran.
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