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| 1 |
ID:
166979
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| Summary/Abstract |
To what extent can energy infrastructure become a tool for insurgents? Non-state, insurgent actors have increased attacks on critical energy infrastructure over time (Giroux et al., 2013). As critical energy infrastructure becomes more complex and interconnected, attacks on this infrastructure can have far reaching consequences not only for the economy but also for social institutions. Leveraging exogenously scheduled elections in Colombia and microlevel energy infrastructure attack data, we use multivariate linear regression to show that insurgent groups, Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Ejército de Liberación (ELN), time attacks on critical energy infrastructure in the months before an election. We find that the likelihood of an attack on electricity transmission lines and substations increased by 34% in the lead up to election months and that the number of attacks increased by 37% during election months. We further find these attacks are correlated with reduced voter turnout, indicating that infrastructure attacks may undermine participation in democratic institutions. These findings are particularly interesting as democratic societies—burgeoning and established—try to identify the unintended vulnerabilities to society that accompany the benefits of increased interconnectedness.
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| 2 |
ID:
180092
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the next three decades, it is likely that on the order of 100 U.S. nuclear power reactors—almost the entire U.S. nuclear fleet, which at its peak in 1990 operated 112 commercial reactors—will be shut down and decommissioned. Decommissioning is a costly, time-consuming process that involves removing or decontaminating all radioactive infrastructure and related materials on site to prevent risks to public health so that the land can be safely used for other beneficial purposes. Though federal regulations have required that plant licensees prepare financially for this eventuality, we argue that particularly in light of commonly used corporate structures designed to strictly segregate financial risks, and under the current energy market conditions, the financial regulations in place may be insufficient in some exigent situations to ensure successful decommissioning. We explore available options for legal recourse if funding is inadequate in a corporate law context and pursuant to existing federal law. We comment on the possibility that taxpayers might be required to shoulder all or part of the financial liability at “legacy” plants in the absence of structural changes.
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