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ID:
167291
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| Summary/Abstract |
Both theorists and practitioners continue to show interest in transatlantic burden-sharing. Resource allocation choices – both to and within defense budgets – are grand strategic choices, and membership in alliances and security communities affects how states make those choices. International security and political economy scholarship offers plausible explanations for transatlantic imbalances in military expenditures. However, NATO allies and EU member-states have pledged to one another not just to spend more on defense, but to allocate more defense resources to equipment modernization. Current scholarship does not fully explain the sources of such within-budget choices, which would help anticipate the likelihood of such pledges succeeding. Building on work by security scholars, defense and political economists, and scholars of interorganizational relations, I argue that stringent fiscal rules dampen the kind of defense spending NATO and EU strategists seek. Governments respond to increasingly stringent fiscal rules by reducing overall defense expenditures, while at the same time shifting existing defense resources to personnel, and away from equipment and operational expenditures. I find evidence in support of this argument by using education levels in the states in question as instruments for fiscal rules. This phenomenon represents a significant risk for important transatlantic strategic initiatives, namely NATO’s Wales pledge on defense investment.
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| 2 |
ID:
184644
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| Summary/Abstract |
How do regime complexes as social orders affect relations among international organizations (IO s)? This article explores this question by studying the longitudinal development of interorganizational practices and the social meanings attached to these practices that constitute a regime complex. Adopting a practice lens, our analysis redirects scholarly attention from rationalist accounts of strategic interactions between IO s to the study of patterned “doings” among actors in regime complexes. The mixed-methods analysis of interorganizational practices between eight IO s in the global health regime complex shows that cooperation among IO s is not primarily the outcome of rational responses to problems of collective action. Rather, IO s engage in similar types of practices because they want to be considered “good” IO s that follow a repertoire of habitual and appropriate practices. In turn, interorganizational practices create social meanings that constrain IO s. The approach put forward in this paper demonstrates the ordering effect of practices on the global health regime complex.
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