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LIU, DONGSHU
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
184743
Public Opinion Backlash against China’s International Expansion
/ Liu, Dongshu; Shao, Li
Shao, Li
Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract
In recent years, China has attempted to expand its international power by initiating projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This article scrutinizes the potential obstacles to China’s expansion from a public opinion perspective. It argues that domestic public opinion may pose two challenges. First, xenophobic sentiments stimulate opposition to the inflow of foreigners and encourage social conflict. Second, the biased distribution of public resources between foreigners and Chinese citizens enhances the sense of inequality and relative deprivation. Nationalist sentiment plays an important role in shaping these two challenges. The authors show that the challenges can impede the implementation of expansive foreign policies. These arguments are supported by evidence from both qualitative and quantitative sources.
Key Words
China’s International Expansion
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2
ID:
167488
Punish the Dissidents: The Selective Implementation of Stability Preservation in China
/ Liu, Dongshu
Liu, Dongshu
Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract
Authoritarian regimes face a dilemma in punishing dissidents. They need extralegal punishments to ensure social stability, but they also want to legalize punishment decisions to sustain an image of adherence to the rule of law. These contradictory goals present an agency problem: local officials must selectively implement the competing goals of the central government. By analyzing data on 1408 dissidents in China from 2007 to 2014, this article argues that local officials are more likely to select legitimate punishments when they experience stronger pressure for career development and their province has a wealthier local economy. These findings reveal the effects of the principal-agent problem on the dynamics of stability preservation in China and indicate that punishment decisions serve not only the needs of regime survival but also the needs of individual officials.
Key Words
China
;
Stability Preservation
;
Selective Implementation
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