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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
172053
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| Summary/Abstract |
Terrorists combining motivations and capabilities to conduct significant chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attacks are, logically and empirically, outliers. Certain characteristics of radical environmentalism heighten the risk of such outliers. The majority of even radical environmentalists embrace nonviolence. Those who turn violent mostly do so in limited ways due to a combination of motivations and capabilities. Fringe elements are motivated to commit large-scale—including CBRN—violence, but are mostly constrained by capability. Yet eco-radicalism also draws more capable adherents. If serious CBRN terrorism attacks occur—a risk about which analysts differ markedly—radical environmentalist fringe actors are plausible perpetrators.
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| 2 |
ID:
167798
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| Summary/Abstract |
Drone swarms—multiple unmanned systems capable of coordinating their actions to accomplish shared objectives—have major implications for the future of warfare. One important set of implications relates to the ability of drone swarms to complement, challenge, and even substitute for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. For example, swarming drones might enable more effective CBRN delivery. Or they might facilitate standoff detection, search the oceans for nuclear-armed submarines, or otherwise impede an adversary’s ability to threaten or employ CBRN weapons. Conventionally armed drone swarms might serve as strategic deterrents in lieu of CBRN weapons. At the same time, many CBRN-relevant applications of drone-swarm technology entail significant technical challenges even for very sophisticated states, and even more so for non-state actors whose capabilities will be far more limited, so there is considerable uncertainty around whether, how much, and when drone-swarm technology will complement, challenge, or substitute for CBRN weapons.
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