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| 1 |
ID:
158958
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article assesses Bernard Fall’s concept of Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina between 1953 and 1958. It also investigates differences in the conceptualization of Revolutionary Warfare between Fall and proponents of French military doctrine known as la guerre révolutionnaire. The last component of the article considers limits of Fall’s influence on counterinsurgency doctrine.
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| 2 |
ID:
158962
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| Summary/Abstract |
In June 2016, the Colombian Government and the FARC insurgent movement signed a ceasefire agreement, which brings the two sides one step closer to putting an end to over five decades of war. Unfortunately, Latin America has a rich history of insurgent movements, particularly during the cold war era, some of which continue to operate today. Most of these movements disappeared due to military operations, though some did so via peace negotiations. This essay aims to discuss the various ends of Latin American insurgencies to answer whether, indeed, insurgents can be negotiated with.
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| 3 |
ID:
158960
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the prevalence of violent uprisings against the states, existing literature has produced a generalized explanation of the causes and onset of such uprisings ignoring crucial aspects of (non-state) armed group cohesion, such as their capabilities to manage intra-group tensions and rivalries. In this paper, I examine recent research in the field of civil conflict to understand the importance of investigating underlying constraints which can cause serious impediments to the capabilities of a state during the course of a war. The paper then focuses on the importance of internal strategic resources, such as pre-war and wartime sociopolitical networks in which insurgents mobilize, recruit new cadres and maintain intra-group cooperation, to suggest how it can contain the consequences of counterinsurgency operations and other state strategies on the internal cohesion of an insurgent group. A detailed case study of the Mizo National Front (MNF) in India demonstrates the argument’s plausibility.
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| 4 |
ID:
158959
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the institutional and functional aspects of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). The Taliban’s coercive approach and its entire reliance on “war-making” to “state-making” shows the difficulty of the transformation of an insurgent group into a state structure. The Taliban was primarily capable of establishing a two-track system of governance. However, the assessment of the IEA’s institutional and functional capabilities shows that the military–political organization formed by the Taliban lacked statehood in all three areas of legitimacy, authority and capacity.
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| 5 |
ID:
158961
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| Summary/Abstract |
Radicalism or radicalisation has become a serious political and academic theme in recent years and any incident involving Muslims now almost automatically acquires the cachet, as events in 2016 and 2017 have shown. However, despite vast sums and resources expended on the subject no one can define what they mean by ‘it’. This should make us pause and question what precisely it is that causes so much alarm and is it worth the resources, time and effort employed to respond to it?
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