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| 1 |
ID:
153897
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article discusses the main aspects of the Brazilian Navy's nuclear-powered submarine program. It first discusses the Brazilian perception that the restrictions imposed by the world powers related to so-called sensitive technologies are a tool to maintain the status quo and hamper the technological progress of developing countries. The article then focuses on the political, economic, technological, and strategic reasons behind the creation and maintenance of the autonomous nuclear-propulsion submarine program. Next, the article examines strategic aspects of the program and their institutionalization in high-level defense documents, informing Brazil's opposition to adopting additional nonproliferation measures. Finally, it discusses Brazilian policy toward the South Atlantic Ocean and the role of the nuclear-powered submarine. The article seeks to shed light on the main reasons that led Brazil to build and maintain such submarines and maps the program's phases of development.
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| 2 |
ID:
131077
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| 3 |
ID:
142649
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| Summary/Abstract |
Narratives about Brazil's nuclear program are distorted by supporters and critics alike. In Brazil, the national nuclear infrastructure is undergoing a period of expansion, with plans to build new nuclear power plants and industrial-scale fuel production facilities. While Brazil's leaders herald the nuclear sector as a triumph for indigenous science and technology, foreigners view the nuclear program as a dangerous legacy of the military regime. This discrepancy becomes even more apparent in discussions about the ongoing construction of Brazil's first nuclear powered submarine. Brazil's military touts the submarine as a symbol of political status, economic growth, and military might. But from abroad, the military's involvement in nuclear development is considered unnecessary, worrisome, and even irresponsible. These narratives—often incomplete or selective—have polarized discussions about Brazil's nuclear submarine program and caused considerable political antagonism during safeguards negotiations. This article works to dispel myths, highlight legitimate concerns, and explain historical perspectives that shed light on some difficulties that can be anticipated in future negotiations.
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| 4 |
ID:
052168
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| 5 |
ID:
077566
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| 6 |
ID:
132250
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The UK is investing in a next generation nuclear submarine propulsion plant to meet the needs of tis successor deterrent submarine programme.
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| 7 |
ID:
153896
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| Summary/Abstract |
Brazil, a developing country with an advanced nuclear program, presents an interesting case for observers of nuclear politics. Brazil is one of a handful of countries that possess uranium-enrichment technology, one of three countries in Latin America that produce nuclear power, and the only country without nuclear weapons to pursue an ambitious nuclear-powered submarine program. Among external views on Brazil's nuclear politics, the perceptions of Argentina and the United States matter most. With Argentina, Brazil shares responsibility for regional security. The two countries’ commitment to a bilateral nuclear safeguards arrangement contributes to a peaceful environment in the region. The United States will continue to set the tone in global nuclear matters and thus its views of Brazil's role in the nuclear field will continue to matter to Brasília, even as Brazil's political and economic crises have thrown the country’s nuclear future into uncertain territory.
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| 8 |
ID:
150762
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| 9 |
ID:
065907
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| 10 |
ID:
129343
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
the induction of the nuclear powered chakra submarine on wet lease from Russia from 1987 to 1991, it was the prelude to the political and strategic vision to embark on a blue water underwater capability akin to the developed countries. However the vision was compulsively short closed owing to the changed political leadership in India and the breakup of the Soviet Union.
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| 11 |
ID:
184921
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| 12 |
ID:
132474
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| Publication |
2014.
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New Delhi's plans for nuclear-armed submarines could undermine efforts to restrict fissile materials, and set off a naval arms race.
India has become a more or less accepted member of the global nuclear order, but the state's emerging undersea deterrent continues to be a source of concern. Its efforts to create nuclear-armed submarines began in the 1980s, and technical progress was slow during the project's first three decades. India has recently made some bold strides, however, and in 2009 unveiled its first nuclear submarine, INS Arihant. The boat is now undergoing sea trials, and is scheduled to be introduced into the Indian Navy by early 2015. Several similar vessels are under construction: New Delhi plans to field a fleet of between four and six nuclear-armed submarines by the end of the decade.
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| 13 |
ID:
094545
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| 14 |
ID:
184565
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| 15 |
ID:
131186
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| Publication |
2014.
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The shipbuilder responsible for designing and developing the US Navy's (USN's) next generation nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) has let a contract for the programme's initial set of turbine generators, officials announced on 27 May.
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| 16 |
ID:
130464
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| Publication |
2014.
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Nuclear power remains the best way to produce large amounts of electricity reliably for homes and businesses. That is why the continuing deficit in nuclear innovation is so troubling, and why Washington needs to seek additional strategies to incentivize and support progress.
These days, the long-term role that nuclear power will play in the global energy market remains uncertain. That would have come as a surprise to the scientists and engineers who, during the 1950s and 1960s, pioneered the study of nuclear fission, built test reactors, and designed nuclear-powered airplanes and rockets. They would also have been surprised, and likely dismayed, that the light-water reactor -- the technology that powered the first nuclear submarine, in 1954 -- remains the dominant commercial technology for producing fission energy.
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| 17 |
ID:
075873
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| 18 |
ID:
183282
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| Summary/Abstract |
Rather than waste its money on nuclear submarines that would provide only a single-dimensional response, South Korea should lock down a superior ASW suite by combining new technologies with existing ROKN platforms to provide multiple mission capabilities for less money, including support by existing maintenance infrastructure.
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| 19 |
ID:
146561
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| Contents |
The MOD's 1997 proposal for a 30-year s/m building programme got CCS endorsement only
in 1999. It consisted of a long term plan for indigenous construction of twenty-four s/m over a period of thirty years. In 2002, Admiral Madhvender the incumbent CNS, is reported to have commended the recent decision of the government to go ahead with the 30 year s/m building plan. He further added that during the first ten years there will be licensed manufacture of s/m. Subsequently, it will be completely indigenous presumably meaning, indigenous design and production.
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| 20 |
ID:
150843
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