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ID:
168440
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the G5 Sahel Joint Force are ad hoc counterterrorism task forces in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel region, respectively. These new task forces enjoy significant international capacity-building support, especially from France and the United States. This article shows that capacity-building actions, while fostering the operationalization of the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel Joint Force, nevertheless have several limitations. Capacity-building counterterrorism initiatives tend to favor security-focused strategies at the expense of efforts that could tackle the structural challenges that fuel terrorism. Such actions are also likely to incentivize dysfunctional practices on the part of security forces and political regimes in recipient countries. It is imperative for major outside players to work with African countries by promoting social and economic development projects, respect for civil rights and freedoms, as well as the community engagement of security forces.
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| 2 |
ID:
192663
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), comprising soldiers from the Lake Chad Basin countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Benin), has been countering insurgency in the region since 2015. Frictional relationships resulting from mutual distrust affected the commitments of MNJTF contributing countries in counterinsurgency operations in Lake Chad. Chad, notably, considered itself an arrowhead in the counterinsurgency due to the laxity of other coalition countries. The devastation its soldiers suffered and the waxing strength of the operation of Boko Haram and allied groups in the region motivated the late Chadian President Idriss Déby to declare in December 2019 the exiting of his soldiers from the MNJTF to concentrate on protecting the borders of the country. The study relied on extant literature and explorative qualitative techniques to investigate the consequences of such exit on northeast Nigeria. At the very least, it reveals that Chad’s exit betrayed the MNJTF counterinsurgency coalition and has negative consequences for the security complexity in northeast Nigeria.
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