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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
170032
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| Summary/Abstract |
Theories of crisis (de-)escalation often focus on conflict, stress, and information problems. However, crisis (de-)escalation may sometimes hinge on how de-escalation is interpreted by domestic audiences. In this article, I combine Putnam's two-level games model of diplomacy with Erving Goffman's concepts of interaction order and face to create a mechanism I call “diplomatic presentation.” I show how diplomatic presentation can be instrumental for the crafting of diplomatic outcomes that states believe are in their mutual interest but that run the risk of being rejected by their domestic publics. Successful diplomatic presentation requires that states collude together to manage their performance, engage in teamwork, and control the impact of unsympathetic audiences. In evaluating this mechanism, I analyze the diplomacy surrounding the Iran Hostage Crisis. During this crisis, regime officials from the United States and Iran colluded in a theatrical “scenario,” in which both sides adopted specific roles in order to satisfy the sentiments of US and Iranian publics. I show that complications regarding the presentation of this scenario explain escalation of the crisis better than prominent alternatives. This argument contributes to the growing literature on symbolic diplomacy in international relations, while also challenging common assumptions about the adversarial nature of crises.
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| 2 |
ID:
168546
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| Summary/Abstract |
The practice turn in IR offers new ways to understand how diplomats can creatively engage with their environment and one another. Yet, sometimes their diplomatic practices limit their ability to achieve agreements. This article focuses on how and why domestic practices conflict with international practices, and why states sometimes might feel constrained into engaging in practices that harm their international position. Drawing on field theory, I introduce a causal mechanism I call symbolic binding that explains why regimes may become so bound by their domestic practices of legitimation that they incur considerable international cost. Symbolic binding occurs when the symbolic practices needed to generate domestic legitimacy intersect and conflict with practices from the diplomatic field, when domestic audiences are observing the diplomatic interaction, and when regimes have limited access to alternative forms of political capital. I demonstrate the logic of this mechanism by analyzing the antagonistic diplomacy that occurred between Britain and China from the late eighteenth until the late nineteenth century. I show that the root of this diplomatic conflict can be linked to the incompatibility of both states’ diplomatic practices and show how the Qing regime's need to maintain domestic legitimacy constrained it into steadfastly adhering to diplomatic practices that were incompatible with that of encroaching European powers.
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| 3 |
ID:
188893
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| Summary/Abstract |
Turkey’s 2019 acquisition of Russian S-400 missile batteries is puzzling. Despite repeated threats of sanctions by the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally Turkey purchased a multi-billion-dollar Russian air defense system that remains nonoperational, fails to cover Turkey’s air defense gap, and led to Turkey’s costly expulsion from the F-35 program. We argue unexpected domestic constraints created by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s symbolic diplomacy raised the political costs of backing away from the deal. Collecting data from media reports and interviews, we analyze how Turkey’s AKP wielded the S-400 as a weapons system legitimating an identity narrative of Turkey as regional counterhegemon, facilitating the cultivation of coalitions with multiple, often competing, constituencies. We demonstrate via process tracing how the inherent ambiguity of symbols allowed nationalist constituencies key to the AKP’s hold on power to amplify the S-400 as symbolic of Turkey’s sovereignty, trapping Turkish officials in a costly policy corner. In unpacking Turkey’s S-400 purchase, the article contributes to the literature on symbolic diplomacy, audience costs, weapons procurement, and deterrence failure.
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