| Summary/Abstract |
Recent research has shown that disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs often fail to uproot wartime command structures. A key question is why some ex-commanders succeed in retaining control over their ex-fighters, while others are less successful. This study seeks to address this question by comparing four former midlevel commanders (ex-MiLCs) in Liberia and the ex-combatant networks that they head. Contrary to previous assumptions, which have stressed the tendency of ex-fighters to flock around ex-commanders operating in spaces of marginality, I argue that ex-MiLCs employed as government brokers and who funnel patronage from ruling elites to ex-combatants are likely to possess the most durable networks. These findings highlight how ex-military bonds thrive where previous research expects them to be weakest: close to government elites who are often designated as “agents of change” by international peacemakers.
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