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ID:
166748
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| Summary/Abstract |
Defence spending has become a primary issue in the context of NATO. The question of fair burden-sharing and development of new capabilities in reaction to the changing security environment led NATO members to aim to spend 2% of GDP on defence by 2024. While some allies have managed to reach the level quickly, others seem not to be able or willing to do so. We know little, however, how the international commitment is reflected and referred to in individual member states. This article shows how size played a role when the 2% pledge was discussed in domestic politics, even if the resulting policy may be very similar. Based on expert and political debates in Germany and Czechia, it demonstrates that external expectations and the question of status play a crucial part in the small state’s reasoning whereas it is mainly internal drivers that shape the big state’s decisions.
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| 2 |
ID:
166747
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Although the Copenhagen school’s securitisation theory and their sectoral analysis are integral parts of European security studies, the school’s economic sector of security has almost been completely ignored. In this article I examine why this is, and whether it makes sense to retain this sector. In the process I flesh out the logic of securitisation in the economic sector. I suggest that one reason why the economic sector of security has been neglected is that real life examples fitting the Copenhagen school’s logic of security as the exception have – in this sector – remained outstanding. Research in other sectors of security has shown however that securitisation does not need to include extraordinary countermeasures; instead it can play out below the level of the exception. Using alternative formulations developed in securitisation studies that relax the threshold for the success of securitisation, I attempt to locate evidence of economic securitisation by looking at two empirical cases. 1) Russia’s economic blackmail of Ukraine at the start of that country’s ongoing crisis. 2) The EU’s conditional bailout of Cyprus during the Eurozone crisis which necessitated capital controls. On the basis of the empirical evidence gathered I conclude by arguing the case for the economic sector of security.
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| 3 |
ID:
166749
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| Summary/Abstract |
Examining the impact of the international system on the domestic system in countries in the process of democratisation, the article seeks to account for the relation between regime-initiated democratic transitions and the international factor, taking two case studies of the way the international factor interacted with the decisions and tactics of regime and opposition elites. The first is the Spanish exemplary reforma pactada of 1977; the second is the much less studied case of the short-lived and aborted “Markezinis experiment” in Greece in 1973, the failure of which has been blamed by its protagonist on external- mainly American- opposition.
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| 4 |
ID:
166746
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| Summary/Abstract |
EU defence policy has been extremely popular over the past three decades, averaging around 75% public support. In fact, no other policy domain is as popular and robust as the idea of pooling national sovereignty over defence. However, public support for EU defence has been dismissed as mere “permissive consensus”, rather than genuine support. Scholars have often assumed that public opinion towards European integration is passive and shallow, especially over foreign policy issues, where the public has limited understanding of the complexity of issues. Consistent with contemporary findings about the complexity of comparative foreign policy attitudes, the authors contest the permissive consensus logic and demonstrate that European publics have held coherent preferences over the use of force at the European level. The authors conclude that the slow progress of integration in this area is due to the reluctance of elites rather than to the reticence of Europe’s citizens.
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| 5 |
ID:
166745
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| Summary/Abstract |
Security provision in and by the EU has become an issue of increasing public interest and controversy. There are diverse and growing demands and critiques from different political camps towards the EU while EU institutions, in turn, utilise their security function as a resource for authority construction and self-legitimation. More recently, European security has also become intertwined with contemporary “crises” that turned it into an arena for the negotiation of fundamental conflicts, often revolving around questions of identity and sovereignty. This paper argues that these developments represent a significant change of European security and its politics that existing approaches linking the field to depoliticisation cannot adequately capture. To fill this gap, this paper suggests applying a politicisation perspective that, so far, has focused on the European integration project as such or the “Eurozone crisis” to the purportedly special security field.
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