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ID:
169404
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| Summary/Abstract |
Based on discussions of small country agency in international relations, this article reexamines China–South Sudan relations from the perspective of asymmetric relationships. Detailing how the asymmetric relationship between China and South Sudan exacerbated misperceptions and conflict, the article also tests the feasibility of applying Brantly Womack's theory of asymmetry in relationships in a non-security context. As asymmetry is an underlying structural factor in China–South Sudan relations, managing the asymmetry will continue to be challenging for both China and South Sudan in the years to come.
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| 2 |
ID:
177952
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| Summary/Abstract |
Existing studies of Chinese officials’ blame avoidance behavior argue that Chinese officials’ motivation for blame avoidance comes from top-down performance evaluation and responsibility attribution pressures and Chinese officials tend to deflect the blame downward to lower levels. Nevertheless, at the early stage of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, local officials made the unusual move of deflecting blame upward onto the central level and both central and local actors became embroiled in a blame game that took place against the backdrop of recent recentralization drive. To better explain this puzzle, this article examines how bottom-up public demands for transparency as well as top-down responsibility attribution pressures together shape the motivations, strategies, and interactions of central and local officials in this blame game. Our research shows that the public appeals for transparency stoked the top-down responsibility attribution pressure, further reinforcing local officials as well as the center’s motivation to avoid blame at the early stage of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan. Local officials and central public health technocrats engaged in a blame game that played out in various media outlets. To insulate itself from public criticism and prevent the blame game from getting out of hand, the center ultimately responded by moving to hold local officials accountable through its propaganda and cadre disciplining apparatus.
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