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| 1 |
ID:
179300
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the start of China’s island-building efforts, there has been widespread concern that these islands would host long-range sensors and munitions and thereby facilitate Chinese military dominance in the South China Sea. This article explains that the military advantages that these islands provide are overstated. The interplay of geography and constraints on sensor coverage leaves China ill-positioned to detect ships and aircraft throughout the South China Sea, let alone to target them. While these technical constraints place hard limits on Chinese military capabilities, ameliorating them would likely face severe political constraints and major tradeoffs in force structure. Consequently, there are grounds for considerable skepticism of widely held concerns about the military implications of China’s island-building efforts. The military balance in the South China Sea has not been greatly altered and China’s anti-access capabilities, such as they are, have not been fully extended into the South China Sea.
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| 2 |
ID:
169459
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| Summary/Abstract |
Whereas much of the debate about the demise of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has focused on the European context and Russia’s alleged treaty violations, Asia looms large in the minds of proponents of the United States’s immediate withdrawal from the treaty. For many proponents, the fast-changing military balance in Asia and China's conventionally armed missiles constitute a sufficient cause for withdrawal. What does the end of the INF Treaty bode for the US-China military balance? This article argues that, although there are some near-term benefits for the US position in the conventional military balance with China, the advantages offered by prohibited missiles are minor and can be readily substituted by extant capabilities that are compliant with the treaty. Given the negative implications of the end of the INF Treaty for the future of arms control, the costs and benefits of withdrawing from the treaty require further examination; the military balance in Asia is an unpersuasive rationale for withdrawing from an important part of the arms-control architecture.
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