| Summary/Abstract |
The United States has sought over the last two decades to facilitate India’s rise as a means of balancing against China’s ambitions. Notwithstanding the rich literature that has emerged on Sino-Indian dynamics and the U.S.-India-China triad, there has been remarkably little examination of the ways in which the United States navigates its relationships with these two rising powers. This study poses a simple question: to what extent has the United States’ pursuit of its interests with India meant that it has accepted trade-offs with respect to its interests with China? Drawing on government documents, interviews with current and former U.S. officials, and an array of case studies between 2005 and early 2019, this study argues first that the U.S. bureaucracy has long been structured in such a way as to heavily compartment policy decision-making related to South Asia and East Asia, respectively, and to produce a pronounced but largely explicable structural bias toward East Asia; second, that relatively few policy matters have arisen since 2005 that have forced the United States to consider meaningful trade-offs between its India and China equities; and third, that new challenges may arise for Washington as its deals with an increasingly inter-connected Indo-Pacific region, and manages the bureaucratic and policy implications of its renewed emphasis on great power competition.
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