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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
170221
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper analyzes the impacting factors of the capital structure of military listed companies in China, based on the 2001–2015 panel data of 104 Chinese listed companies, and we explore practical approaches for Chinese private capital entering the military enterprises, given the strategy of the civil–military integration. We show that: (1) state-owned shares and domestic legal person shares negatively impact the capital structure of military enterprises and mainly show in non-current liability. While the foreign legal person shares and the shareholding ratio of executives and managers have no significant impact. (2) As for the financial indicators, coefficients of firm size, asset tangibility, and growth are positive, while those of profitability, non-debt tax shield, and growth opportunity are negative. (3) Given the civil–military integration strategy, equity financing imposes a negative impact on the capital structure of military enterprises. The negative impact increases, with the increase in military enterprises’ profitability, business risk, and growth opportunities, and with the decrease in military enterprises’ growth and firm size. (4) The negative impacts of equity financing are significant, if debt ratios of the military enterprises are too small or too large. While the state-owned shares only have significant negative impact on military enterprises whose debt ratios are too small. As a conclusion, we suggest private capital to prioritize the corporate bonds or short-term borrowing to enter the military industry, and choose smaller or medium-sized military enterprises with more growth opportunities and lower business risks.
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| 2 |
ID:
177834
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite China’s rise on the world stage and rapid improvements in the quality and quantity of its arms production, little is truly known about Chinese defence groups’ performance. The existing literature suffers from a significant gap: there has been no measure of how much the Chinese defence industry is worth financially, in comparison to other leading defence firms. There is also a dearth in detailed assessments of China’s defence-industrial and defence-innovation capacities. Therefore, this article seeks to provide reliable estimates of Chinese defence enterprises’ revenue derived from their military-related activities. In discussing our results, we also show that the current Chinese leadership’s defence-industry reforms specifically target self-identified shortcomings and in doing so, strives to bring Chinese defence companies to the top of the world’s defence-technological innovation standards. This will contribute to the debate on China’s defence-innovation capabilities and on the Chinese defence industry’s remaining weaknesses in that regard.
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