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ID:
170276
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| Summary/Abstract |
The aim of the current study is to discuss which particular factors Russia considers as sufficient deterrent capabilities and whether the national defence models implemented in the Baltic countries have the potential to deter Russia's military planners and political leadership. Whilst the existing conventional reserves of NATO are sizeable, secure, and rapid, deployment is still a critical variable in case of a conflict in the Baltic countries because of the limited range of safe transportation options. However, whilst the Baltic States are developing their capabilities according to the priorities defined by NATO in 2010; which were updated after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian military planners have meanwhile redesigned both their military doctrine and military forces, learning from the experience of the Russo-Georgian war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and other recent confrontations. Accordingly, there is a risk that the efforts of the Baltic countries could prove rather inefficient in deterring Russia.
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| 2 |
ID:
175691
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Defender 2020 military exercise and its related deployments look fairly reasonable and rational from the perspective of the Baltic States and NATO, but when theoretically analyzing its options left, the Russian political leadership could react severely or enact a series of policies from such an initial “provocation”. More importantly, Russia could perceive that the Baltic Sea Region is being transformed into a potential area for confrontation from which also they could benefit from additional escalation. In the broadest sense, the article tries to both clarify and join the intentions of NATO and the reaction of Russia.
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