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| 1 |
ID:
144376
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s second-generation rural-to-urban migrant youth, who grew up in their parents’ adopted cities, are still denied urban residential status and suffer from the institutional closure of higher education opportunities. This article explores in ethnographic detail the experiences and subjectivities of migrant youth in Shanghai who since 2008 have been channeled to secondary vocational schools. It highlights the direct involvement of the local state in reproducing a social hierarchy in which migrant youth provide cheap labor for manufacturing and low-skilled service industries. It reveals how contention over the limited choice of majors and career trajectories persists between state intention, market demand and individual aspirations. The time and space provided by vocational schooling enable migrant students to gain urban habitus and form networks across boundaries. Vocational schools have thus become a unique site for studying education and class reproduction in a late-socialist context.
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| 2 |
ID:
144379
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| Summary/Abstract |
The last few years have seen a vigorous public policy debate emerge over a “second-generation” ethnic policy (di’erdai minzu zhengce) which, if implemented, would constitute a major revision of ethnic politics in China. Despite the fact that nationalities policy is a notoriously sensitive subject within China, the debate is happening openly in newspapers, academic journals and on the Internet. The prominence accorded to anthropological theory and international comparison is a notable feature of the debate. This article first explores the main positions in the ongoing policy discussion, then goes on to argue that, rather than comparing China’s non-Han peoples to minority immigrant populations in the industrialized democracies, a better comparison is to indigenous peoples. It then considers why this perspective is completely missing from the present debate.
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| 3 |
ID:
144375
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This article examines the mechanisms of conflict resolution by public deliberation in Chinese urban residential communities. The analysis focuses on the interactions between three key actors of community life: Residents’ Committees (as the agent of the state), residents, and their representative organizations. Based on empirical data from three types of urban communities, the article finds that deliberation is more effective in communities where the power of Residents’ Committees over residents is weak, and deliberation also works better in communities with strong resident representatives who are able to mobilize information flows and to shape public reasoning. The findings suggest that, on the one hand, the governance structure of Chinese urban residential communities provides space for informal, unstructured public deliberation; on the other hand, deliberation also meets obstacles and dilemmas associated with representation, coordination and fostering understanding across social and economic divisions.
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| 4 |
ID:
144374
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite a growing literature on peasant protest in contemporary China, we know little about why some protests are more sustained, disruptive and violent—in a word, militant—than others and thus pose a more serious challenge to the political order. The influential concept of “rightful resistance” cannot explain protest militancy, because it only applies to civil protest. This article studies a case of unusually militant peasant protest in Qizong, Hunan. The protest became militant because the peasants rallied around well-educated and fearless leaders and established a layered and encompassing protest organization. Empowered by central policies on lowering taxes and fees on the peasants (the so-called “peasant burden”) and the Confucian norm of subsistence, the peasants successfully mobilized for drastic reduction of the burden. Local government could not contain the protest, having lost its moral authority and lacking the resources either to suppress it or to make sufficient concessions.
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| 5 |
ID:
144373
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines how financial compensation has been drawn into death sentencing practice and debate in China. The Supreme People’s Court is nowadays encouraging judges to mediate between defendants and the families of homicide victims to secure a financial agreement between the two parties that will allow courts to sentence defendants to a two-year “suspended” death sentence which is commuted to a life sentence after the probation period. The SPC has promoted a series of “standard cases” that exemplify this practice. The controversial practice, dubbed “cash for clemency”, complicates the death penalty debate: critics say that it undermines the law and encourages “bargaining” for a life on the part of those who can afford to do so. Others, however, are sympathetic to any practice that can reduce execution rates. This controversy is part of a larger debate on state killing in the world’s largest killing state.
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| 6 |
ID:
144378
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes the Chinese Communist Party’s opaque mishu (secretary) system. It consists of two branches: institutional mishu and personal mishu. The former are mainly employed in Party Committee general offices, to assist the Committee leadership and liaise between departments to push Committee policies and to administer and compile relevant documents to support the policy-making process. Personal mishu work instead in the individual leaders’ executive offices. Those working for members of the Politburo Standing Committee can be divided into four main categories: political, confidential, security and life mishu. Both institutional and personal mishu work essentially on behalf of CCP leaders at various levels. In addition to clarifying the formal arrangements of the mishu system, this article will also consider the system through the lens of unrestricted informal politics, discussing particularly how mishu are able to accumulate power through leverage of the client–patron relationship between themselves and their leading cadre.
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| 7 |
ID:
144377
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| Summary/Abstract |
The socialist-era danwei lives on in contemporary, ever-reforming China. Ironically, the processes of reform helped to enable the perpetuation of the traditional danwei’s paternalistic practices by concentrating monopoly power in selected, partially market-listed, centrally owned enterprise groups. The Tarim Oilfield Company is an outstanding example of this balancing act between socialist and market structures—a neo-danwei. This article maps these structures using detailed ethnographic data gathered over two years working in the company. Multiple subjective viewpoints show that distinctions between different categories of employee are crucial to maintaining the danwei in the midst of marketization. Like the socialist-era danwei, the oil company produces dependency and constrains social mobility. Yet, amidst glorification of open competition and individual achievement, the desire to enter a danwei is as strong as ever. The certainty of danwei life is highly valued; stability becomes a status symbol.
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