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ID:
170118
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE OPEN LETTER ON US CHINA POLICY below has been signed by over 130 China specialists. I am one of them. The letter is an attempt to move US policy with Beijing onto a more constructive path in dealing, both cooperatively and competitively, at a crucial juncture in the US-China relationship. Tensions and disputes have once again come to predominate, and the optimism that once tended to prevail about the ability of the two governments to overcome obstacles is now largely gone. Quite a few China specialists who would normally associate themselves with engaging China have now joined with the Trump administration in urging a hard line on trade, military, and other issues. The open letter is a timely rejoinder to that trend.
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| 2 |
ID:
170117
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| 3 |
ID:
170115
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| Summary/Abstract |
We aim to verify how identifications (South Korean identification and ethnic identification) directly and indirectly influence the attitude toward Korean unification through the perception of North Korea (hostile vs. cooperative). Based on national wide survey data (N = 1,000), we investigated the structural relationships among the variables using a structural equation model. The research results reveal that (1) ethnic identification and South Korean identification and cooperative perception and confrontational perception toward North Korea are distinguishable concepts respectively; (2) ethnic identification has a direct effect on positive attitude toward unification and also has an indirect effect on one's attitude through cooperative North Korea perception; and (3) South Korean identification has a direct but negative influence on positive attitude toward unification but does not have a significant influence on perception toward North Korea. The implications of the research are discussed.
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| 4 |
ID:
170116
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| 5 |
ID:
170113
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| Summary/Abstract |
Philippines-China relations have experienced dramatic turns, from a "golden age" to "Asia's most toxic bilateral relationship," followed by a new "spring time," as described by the media. Why does the Philippines' China policy oscillate so much? This article looks at the role of the president in the Philippines' foreign policymaking by examining the country's China policy under the leadership of three Philippines' presidents: Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Benigno Aquino III, and Rodrigo Duterte. The findings show that although individual presidents have opportunities to promote their own preferences in dealing with China, they are not free from constraints. Despite showing great oscillations in rhetoric, the actual policies undertaken by each administration have never completely shifted to one or another extreme of the Sino-American spectrum: balancing against China using the alliance with the United States, or bandwagoning with China at the cost of losing the alliance with the United States.
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| 6 |
ID:
170112
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| Summary/Abstract |
Following the collapse of diplomatic negotiations with North Korea in 2012, the Obama administration settled on a policy approach dubbed "strategic patience." That policy involved the gradually escalating application of nonviolent means of coercion as the North Korean nuclear problem that it purported to arrest grew more acute over time. But what led the Obama administration to adopt this confrontational yet timid approach to North Korea? Using a configurational analysis, this article proposes that the Obama-era policy of "strategic patience" had little to do with North Korea per se, and instead derived primarily from the intersection of three different factors: the prioritizations necessary as part of the US "rebalance to Asia" strategy; fear that South Korean aggression would pull the United States into an unwanted war in Korea; and a prevailing belief among many policymakers that the North Korean regime would eventually collapse under the pressures of its own contradictions. This combination of priorities and beliefs led the Obama administration to treat the North Korean nuclear issue seriously but not urgently, resorting to actions incommensurate with the nature of the problem.
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| 7 |
ID:
170114
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| Summary/Abstract |
Singapore is an active and significant actor in the Asia Pacific region. Most of the analysis of Singapore's foreign policy falls on the theoretical spectrum between (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism—theories focusing on its economic and security interests and power politics. In this article I draw upon the theoretical framework of political adaptation to provide a fresh analytical perspective on Singapore's regional activity. I show how further refining the political adaptation framework beyond its existing dimensions to include active, passive, and reactive adaptation sheds light on how Singapore adapts its foreign policy to maximize its role in regional and inter-regional institutions. The article examines three empirical case studies at different levels of Singapore's external engagement: (1) ASEAN at the closest regional level, (2) APEC at the wider regional level, and (3) ASEM at the inter-regional level.
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