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ID:
169474
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| Summary/Abstract |
Existing concepts (e.g. ‘non-interference’ and ‘pragmatism’) remain too vague to provide explanations for China’s increasingly assertive security policy. To avoid this pitfall, this article adopts a narrower focus on Chinese security policy towards Africa. It explores two contrasting cases, namely Sudan/South Sudan and Mali to demonstrate that China: a) pursues security engagement only after obtaining permission by relevant parties (UN; regional organizations; target state); b) favours peacekeeping (stability) over peacebuilding (arbitrary support for emerging regimes); c) strategically interweaves its economic goals and security policy strategy. The article thus re-conceptualizes China’s new security policy towards Africa as ‘consultative peacekeeping.’
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| 2 |
ID:
169471
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article deals with the state of play in the relationships between the United States, India and Russia. The focus of the article is placed on the geopolitical environment in which the three countries have been building their relationships in contemporary times. The author analyses the approaches of the US, India and Russia towards two geographical concepts of the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia. The situation in Afghanistan is examined through perspectives and interests of all three players as each of them is involved—though in a different manner—in the resolution of the crisis. The author displays the role of Beijing as a key variable for the US-India-Russia triangle.
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| 3 |
ID:
169473
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Western Indian Ocean (WIO) is now attaining centrestage in the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean. Apart from France and the US, China holds significant interests in the WIO. China’s interests with the WIO states could be divided in four categories: dual-use infrastructure building, politico-diplomatic focus, connectivity-access and military activities. All four are interconnected and facilitate China’s desire to project power. For China, activities in the WIO serve the purpose of ensuring energy supplies, maintaining economic growth and securing military interests. China’s engagement with the WIO states presents difficult challenges for major powers of the Indian Ocean like India.
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| 4 |
ID:
169476
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| Summary/Abstract |
Long before the Atlantic and the Pacific became theatres for commerce and conflict, the Indian Ocean was home to considerable commercial and cultural intercourse. Most recent literature has, however, focused on maritime security and sea power while greater attention ought to be paid to economic development around the Indian Ocean. India’s plans for the development of the ‘Blue Economy’ augurs well for the region.
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| 5 |
ID:
169472
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the arena of international relations nation-states have been regarded as the primary actors. However, the constituent units of nation-states have also become active in forging relations with the political units which are located outside the national borders through ‘para-diplomacy’. Since the 1990s the states of Indian union have been playing a significant role in India’s foreign affairs. The Narendra Modi government in New Delhi has also established a ‘States Division’ in the Ministry of External Affairs. In this regard, the Republic of Korea has initiated ‘Caravan events’ to engage with the states in India. This article aims to examine and explain Korea’s para-diplomacy with states in India.
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| 6 |
ID:
169475
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article contends that the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) is European Union’s (EU) most visionary trans-regional connectivity project. It theorizes the EU-TRACECA relationship to show that the TRACECA represents different regional integration concepts, and that the EU scripted it invariably for the mutual benefits of its partner states. Conceptually optimistic, the article, nonetheless, discovers certain inextricable complications in the TRACECA’s real working for varying economic profiles of and mutual conflicts among its member countries. Simultaneously, however, it argues that TRACECA can be a trailblazer for the 2018 ‘New EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy’ as it has already the requisite infrastructure for the purpose.
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