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ID:
181757
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| Summary/Abstract |
The British Army faces a future where urban operations may take an increasingly prominent place. Despite this, it remains largely unready for any possible contingencies of this type. Of all the obstacles to the British Army being effective in a complex urban environment, the issue of generating, employing and sustaining sufficient mass is both prominent and poorly understood. Nick Reynolds argues that mass is not as useful in concentrating force in the attack as is commonly perceived, but is essential for dominating ground, screening and cordoning. The British Army will most likely either find itself fighting a peer or near-peer state adversary, or attempting to control a population in a failed state, and will do so as part of an alliance or partnership. Other allies and partners will provide much of the mass, which will mostly need to be employed for cordoning and ground-holding rather than in the attack. The British Army should prepare accordingly. There is also a need for a greater focus on the operational level of war, both conceptually and practically.
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| 2 |
ID:
184613
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| Summary/Abstract |
Tactical ground combat formations need good tactical communications systems to be effective. New battlespace management technology occurs in the context of an increasingly contested electromagnetic spectrum, with serious implications for digital communications systems and networks architecture. Nick Reynolds argues that simplicity, resilience and repairability should be combined with better education about communications systems and networks and the electromagnetic spectrum, to ensure that these systems remain operational under adversarial conditions while still tactically assisting users. Furthermore, militaries should move away from aiming for assured communications and connectivity at all times, for even modernised systems will either be vulnerable to degradation and denial or will create a signature that may be exploited for enemy targeting and fires.
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| 3 |
ID:
170787
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| Summary/Abstract |
Using Operation Panther’s Claw as a case study, Nick Reynolds identifies tactical and operational combat lessons from the Helmand campaign that are relevant to warfighting at scale. Future conflicts will be hybrid, will include an asymmetric threat, and are more likely to occur in complex or urban terrain. British forces will have to fight dispersed and in depth. They must be capable of retaining mobility, must have a high level of organic lethality to compensate for the difficulties with establishing mutual support, and be prepared to fight intermingled with regular and irregular enemy forces as operational penetration will be inevitable.
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| 4 |
ID:
177480
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| Publication |
Abingdon, RUSI, 2020.
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| Description |
v, 110p.pbk
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| Series |
Whitehall Paper ; 97
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| Standard Number |
9780367766405
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059993 | 327.17/WAT 059993 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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