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| 1 |
ID:
170166
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, as China has continued to rise as an economic, political and military power, there has been increasing consideration of its role in shaping US–India relations over the last two decades. However, this article, considering the period 1949–1979, shows that American and Indian perceptions of and policy toward China shaped the US–India relationship even during the Cold War. In doing so, the article seeks not just to bring China back into the story of past US–India relations, but also shed light on the China–India–US triangle of today and of tomorrow.
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| 2 |
ID:
170167
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the focus of global politics shifting to the Indo-Pacific and the maritime domain becoming the new theater of global power politics, the triangular relationship between India, the US, and China needs a fresh evaluation. This article examines the evolution of the India-US-China triangle since the end of the Cold War from the perspective of New Delhi. It argues that a combination of structural and domestic political variables has led to a significant shift from a soft balancing approach by China and India vis-à-vis the US to a more robust limited hard balancing by India and the US vis-à-vis China.
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| 3 |
ID:
170169
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| Summary/Abstract |
This research examines China’s official perspectives on, and interpretation of, U.S.-China-India relations by surveying official, quasi-official, and some most relevant scholarly publications. China’s official line has always emphasized the bilateral nature of the relationship between China and India fending off any third-party interference, including that from the United States. Neither Chinese leaders nor the regime’s official media outlets would speak of China–India relationship with a triangular framework (with a rare exception of the Russia–India–China triangle). In the context of the rapid evolvement of U.S.-India military cooperation, the Chinese official line remains unforthcoming about whether such developments have direct implication for China’s security or national interests. Chinese core official media has in fact minimized the popularization of the idea that containing China is the driving force behind any cooperation between India and the United States.
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| 4 |
ID:
170168
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States has sought over the last two decades to facilitate India’s rise as a means of balancing against China’s ambitions. Notwithstanding the rich literature that has emerged on Sino-Indian dynamics and the U.S.-India-China triad, there has been remarkably little examination of the ways in which the United States navigates its relationships with these two rising powers. This study poses a simple question: to what extent has the United States’ pursuit of its interests with India meant that it has accepted trade-offs with respect to its interests with China? Drawing on government documents, interviews with current and former U.S. officials, and an array of case studies between 2005 and early 2019, this study argues first that the U.S. bureaucracy has long been structured in such a way as to heavily compartment policy decision-making related to South Asia and East Asia, respectively, and to produce a pronounced but largely explicable structural bias toward East Asia; second, that relatively few policy matters have arisen since 2005 that have forced the United States to consider meaningful trade-offs between its India and China equities; and third, that new challenges may arise for Washington as its deals with an increasingly inter-connected Indo-Pacific region, and manages the bureaucratic and policy implications of its renewed emphasis on great power competition.
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| 5 |
ID:
170165
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this paper we build on Robert Jervis’ concept of strategic triangles, relations between three states where from the point of view of each state the others are pivotal for its security or foreign policy behavior in a given region. We argue that triangles are important in influencing state behavior in the areas of balance of power, deterrence, arms races and status competition, and consider how these dimensions might interact. In this context, this article examines the US–India–China triangle, while also addressing to a lesser extent how other related triangles interlink with it, taking into account how China’s rise and increasing economic interdependence impact these relations.
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| 6 |
ID:
170164
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the Narendra Modi-led National Democratic Alliance government settles in its second term with a plethora of foreign policy challenges looming large, it faces unusual headwinds from what should be a “natural partner” – the United States – on both economic and strategic fronts. In June 2019, the Trump administration announced the revocation of India’s special trade status on the grounds that “India had not assured the US that it will provide equitable and reasonable access to its market.”1 Special trade status, also known as the Generalized System of Preferences allows duty-free imports of goods up to US$5.6 billion into the United States from India.
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