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ID:
181188
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Summary/Abstract |
US Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III have made significant official visits to Southeast Asia. Both sought to address concerns that the US had paid insufficient attention to the region during President Joe Biden's early months in office. But they left unanswered substantial questions about future US strategy as to both the Asia-Pacific as a whole and Southeast Asia in particular. This underlined doubts about Washington's ability to create and develop the kind of regional initiatives, institutions and partnerships that might help to blunt China's rise and draw nations in Southeast Asia back towards the US. To do so, the US will have to marshal deep focus and subtle statecraft to create new diplomatic architecture and set new standards for the region in areas such as trade and new technologies. Otherwise, American influence in the region is likely to decline.
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ID:
171046
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Publication |
Noida, HarperCollins Publishers, 2018.
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Description |
xxv, 358p.hbk
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Standard Number |
9789353020170
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
059862 | 330.954/CRA 059862 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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3 |
ID:
173048
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ID:
179825
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Summary/Abstract |
The West’s Build Back Better World Partnership will be hard-pressed to compete effectively with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
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5 |
ID:
188451
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Summary/Abstract |
The United States intends to manage China’s rise by forging a new balancing coalition of ‘like-minded’ partners and by developing deeper ties with other nations in the Indo-Pacific that view themselves as broadly non-aligned. Washington hopes that closer ties to the US and its partners will stop such countries from drifting towards China. But to create these deeper relationships, the non-aligned group also needs reassurance that attempts by the like-minded partners to integrate capabilities and fashion a new regional balance of power will not tip the Indo-Pacific towards conflict. Like-minded nations will need to appreciate the risks that security initiatives like the Quad and AUKUS are perceived to create, realise that Hanoi or Jakarta is unlikely to embrace Canberra’s or Tokyo’s vision of the region’s future warmly, and be willing to make substantial material investments. Tension between integration and reassurance will inevitably endure.
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