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ID:
180461
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| Summary/Abstract |
Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive, personnel reshuffles, and institutional overhauls seem to mark a turning point in Beijing’s long-running fight against ‘localism’ (difangzhuyi). Yet, key questions remain about the scope and effectiveness of efforts to rein in China’s subnational officials. Has the Xi administration effectively combated localism by appointing more outsiders to provincial leadership teams? Or have strengthened oversight institutions made subnational officials more responsive to the center regardless of their individual backgrounds? To address these questions, this article distinguishes between different types of localism in contemporary China and the varying personnel ‘risk factors’ underlying them. Comparing the makeup of provincial party standing committees under Xi Jinping’s 18th CPC Central Committee (2012–2017) with those from the 15–17th CPC Central Committees under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (1997–2012), the analysis finds that Xi has accelerated personnel changes to address multiple forms of localism. At the same time, gaps in governance outcomes between local cadres and outsiders have faded since 2012 in several domains, implying that Xi-era institutional reforms have also played a role in curbing localism. Even under Xi, however, important personnel risk factors for localism have persisted and in some domains local-outsider differences in governance outcomes have actually increased.
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| 2 |
ID:
171084
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| Summary/Abstract |
In a Xi Jinping era of rising central power and policy activism, what role is left for Chinese provinces? This article argues that, notwithstanding centralizing tendencies, China’s recent economic development trajectory cannot be understood without taking into account the distinctive policy roles and priorities of provincial governments. Successive waves of governance restructuring have in many ways strengthened rather than weakened provincial authorities, reinforcing their role as central-local gatekeepers within China’s political economy. In particular, we draw attention to the ways that provinces create and shape “development space” (fazhan kongjian 发展空间) for different industries and localities and alter the contours of China’s international economic engagement. We explore how provinces use their position as brokers of development space to concentrate investment in privileged areas of the economy while neglecting other aspects of development, deviating from central priorities in the process. Using case studies about industrial policy, rural development, and foreign economic relations, we show how—even in an era of centralism—provinces’ developmental drive remains untamed.
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