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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
171836
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why do some territorial disputes defy settlement? Through what mechanism might these resistant territorial disputes be settled? We propose that the answer involves three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. First, the dispute must receive attention—i.e., be (re)placed and (re)prioritized on the dyad's agenda. Second, governments need altered preferences that expand the bargaining range so they can break deadlock and pursue settlement. Finally, disputing states need third-party assistance to facilitate, locate, incentivize, and support a settlement of their protracted dispute. We test this “AAA Model” in post–World War II Latin America. To do this, we first theorize the particular form of the general model; in post–1945 Latin America, attention, altered preferences, and third-party assistance operate through the mechanisms of militarization, democratization, and mediation respectively. We then identify resistant territorial disputes and advance a novel, multimethod research design to evaluate our hypotheses—one that relies more heavily on within-case counterfactual analysis. An extensive series of these counterfactual analyses, along with a statistical analysis, produce consistent, significant support for our model. When resistant territorial disputes in post–1945 Latin America have attention, altered preferences, and third-party assistance simultaneously, they always settle; when they lack any one factor, however, settlement never occurs.
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| 2 |
ID:
171220
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why did Argentina risk seizing the Malvinas/Falkland Islands by force in 1982, provoking a war against Great Britain, and what are the larger implications of this case? We revisit this influential episode using counterfactual analysis to interpret newly declassified declarations of high-ranking state officials involved in the decision to occupy the islands. These sources cast doubt on the diversionary-war and miscalculation theses of the Malvinas/Falklands War, among other extant interpretations. Evidence suggests long-term power dynamics and prospect theory better explain Argentine foreign policy behavior leading to the war. Due to aversion to tangible losses, the leadership of waning states like Argentina might favor risky military strategies despite their low expected utility. These biases may provoke a war if decision-making groups are small and isolated from de-biasing influences. Our explanation illustrates the value of prospect theory to understand why certain declining states behave aggressively and more plausibly explains the Malvinas/Falklands War when confronted to set-theoretic counterfactual analysis.
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