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ID:
171322
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| Summary/Abstract |
Conflicts between sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoralists (herders) are a common phenomenon in Africa. In recent scholarship, environmental change, structural violence and capital flows to agro-pastoral communities are identified as the core conflict drivers. Although scholars differ on the exact causal pathways, most arguments ultimately centre around competition over access to water and land. Yet there is a lot more to learn about the ecology of these conflicts, especially people’s perception of pastoral nomads and its implication for conflict resolution. The tendency among researchers is to explore the conflict as if it comprises only objective realities devoid of subjective beliefs. Yet my research shows that popular representations of Fulani herders in Nigeria today reflect ancient stereotypes of nomadic peoples. By ignoring this subjective dimension of the conflict, we limit our understanding of its causes and the reason(s) behind its protraction, and, by extension, are blinded to the need for prejudice reduction. This paper argues that the perception of pastoral nomads as savages is a factor in the conflict because it shapes people’s relationship with, and reception of, Fulani herders. Hence, it must be grasped, probed and included in the visioning of conflict resolution.
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| 2 |
ID:
171810
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the relevance of the dominant, population-centered, counterinsurgency doctrine in an era dominated by Salafi-inspired state challengers. Building on Weinstein's (2007) argument, I argue that an insurgent group's emergent nature, shaped by its origin, affects how it will operate and the kind of strategy most likely to defeat it. I investigate the plausibility of my claims through an examination of Boko Haram. I demonstrate the disconnect between Boko Haram's Salafi ideology and its objective of establishing a caliphate, on the one hand, and the strategy of dialogue and socioeconomic reforms to end the insurgency, on the other. In light of this disjuncture, I argue that the key to Boko Haram's defeat lies in the mobilization of international military and intelligence resources to strengthen the Nigerian government's enemy-centered counterinsurgency operation against the group.
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