| Summary/Abstract |
The article seeks to explore the evolving defense relationship between Russia and China in the context of nuclear policy doctrine. There are multiple studies of nuclear doctrine in relation to each country, yet this article tries to connect them in the sense of consiring the possible influence of Moscow’s nuclear doctrine on Beijing. In doing this, the author examines the nature of the growing ‘strategic partnership’ between Russia and China to include tracing its origins, limits, and ambiguity and the speculative question of an emerging ‘de facto alliance’. It outlines the growth in military-to-military contacts, developing joint military exercises both bilateral and multilateral, as well as Moscow’s decision to involve China in its annual strategic level military exercises, contrasting Vostok 2010 and Vostok 2018. Indeed, there is a policy perception in Western government circles, particularly in the United States, that should war erupt with Russia that the latter will find itself alone; this is certainly open to question and potentially a dangerous oversight in Washington policy circles, as well as among its allies. The article also raises important questions concerning Moscow’s continued adherence to the undeclared nuclear policy of ‘escalate-to-de-escalate’ and its further strengthening of the conventional level of ‘pre-nuclear’ deterrence. In essence, this article raises questions of interest in the policy and scholarly communities, rather than proving concrete conclusions.
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