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ID:
167558
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article uses interviews with inhabitants of Crimea to analyse individual-level narratives surrounding the annexation of the peninsula by Russia and locate these narratives in relation to recent research on changes in Ukrainian identity discourse. It investigates how the trauma of the 2014 political change affected respondents’ identifications and led to the reworking of earlier identity narratives as a means of re-establishing the subjects’ ontological integrity. As a result, three narratives (those of supporters of the change, non-supporters and ambivalent respondents) were established. The narratives of pro-Russian and ambivalent Crimeans were found to be similar, highlighting a sense of trauma that the imagined unity between Ukraine and Russia had been undermined. The narratives of pro-Ukrainian Crimeans focused on the loss of unity within the Crimean community.
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| 2 |
ID:
168903
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article uses interviews with inhabitants of Crimea to analyse individual-level narratives surrounding the annexation of the peninsula by Russia and locate these narratives in relation to recent research on changes in Ukrainian identity discourse. It investigates how the trauma of the 2014 political change affected respondents’ identifications and led to the reworking of earlier identity narratives as a means of re-establishing the subjects’ ontological integrity. As a result, three narratives (those of supporters of the change, non-supporters and ambivalent respondents) were established. The narratives of pro-Russian and ambivalent Crimeans were found to be similar, highlighting a sense of trauma that the imagined unity between Ukraine and Russia had been undermined. The narratives of pro-Ukrainian Crimeans focused on the loss of unity within the Crimean community.
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| 3 |
ID:
168905
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| Summary/Abstract |
Gazprom, the state-controlled Russian energy company, has major export markets in the European Union, but these are changing, challenging the established trading principles of Russian gas. The EU promotes switching to hub-based pricing, whereas Gazprom, despite adapting to some degree, has continued to highlight the advantages of long-term contracts. This article analyses the reasoning of selected Gazprom actors from an institutional-cultural perspective. Apart from conflicts of interest between Russia and the EU, it finds deep-seated differences in worldviews and perceptions of appropriate behaviour in trade relations. Such factors may play a larger role in decision-making than is generally acknowledged.
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| 4 |
ID:
167560
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| Summary/Abstract |
Gazprom, the state-controlled Russian energy company, has major export markets in the European Union, but these are changing, challenging the established trading principles of Russian gas. The EU promotes switching to hub-based pricing, whereas Gazprom, despite adapting to some degree, has continued to highlight the advantages of long-term contracts. This article analyses the reasoning of selected Gazprom actors from an institutional-cultural perspective. Apart from conflicts of interest between Russia and the EU, it finds deep-seated differences in worldviews and perceptions of appropriate behaviour in trade relations. Such factors may play a larger role in decision-making than is generally acknowledged.
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| 5 |
ID:
167561
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| Summary/Abstract |
The willingness of successive Polish governments to support and participate in US-led multilateral military interventions—such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq—has been explained in terms of Poland's prevailing strategic culture. Yet in 2011 Poland opted to exclude itself from participating in the NATO campaign against Libya. It is argued that this was not a counter-cultural decision, but was instead a case of one strategic subculture supplanting another. The support that the government received from opposition politicians and the press can be taken as evidence that the policy did not represent a radical departure from Poland's strategic culture.
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| 6 |
ID:
168906
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| Summary/Abstract |
The willingness of successive Polish governments to support and participate in US-led multilateral military interventions—such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq—has been explained in terms of Poland's prevailing strategic culture. Yet in 2011 Poland opted to exclude itself from participating in the NATO campaign against Libya. It is argued that this was not a counter-cultural decision, but was instead a case of one strategic subculture supplanting another. The support that the government received from opposition politicians and the press can be taken as evidence that the policy did not represent a radical departure from Poland's strategic culture.
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| 7 |
ID:
168908
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| Summary/Abstract |
The dichotomy of Self/Other prevails in shaping identity. This article asks how and to what extent the elements of the EU’s image produced by media discourse shape the national identity of Kazakhstan. It contends that a state’s identity can be formulated not in opposition—that is, not ‘Us against Them’—but rather, ‘Us as One of Them’. It argues that, in the case of Kazakhstan, the predominantly positive media discourse about the EU ‘Other’ contributes to a positive formulation of the Self via the legitimisation of the domestic regime on the national and international levels.
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| 8 |
ID:
167563
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| Summary/Abstract |
The dichotomy of Self/Other prevails in shaping identity. This article asks how and to what extent the elements of the EU’s image produced by media discourse shape the national identity of Kazakhstan. It contends that a state’s identity can be formulated not in opposition—that is, not ‘Us against Them’—but rather, ‘Us as One of Them’. It argues that, in the case of Kazakhstan, the predominantly positive media discourse about the EU ‘Other’ contributes to a positive formulation of the Self via the legitimisation of the domestic regime on the national and international levels.
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| 9 |
ID:
167562
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article uses principal–agent theory to examine the governance of solar energy in China and question the notion of ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ in Chinese governance. It demonstrates that the governance of solar energy in China operates on two levels, with ‘police patrol’ control and monitoring mechanisms at the meso- or sectoral level combined with ‘fire alarm’ modes of political control at the micro-level. Drawing on original interview material, we argue that this two-level model and distinct set of supervisory institutions have allowed China, as a relatively late entrant into the solar energy sector, to address the growing environmental emergency within China and catch up technologically with the West.
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| 10 |
ID:
168907
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article uses principal–agent theory to examine the governance of solar energy in China and question the notion of ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ in Chinese governance. It demonstrates that the governance of solar energy in China operates on two levels, with ‘police patrol’ control and monitoring mechanisms at the meso- or sectoral level combined with ‘fire alarm’ modes of political control at the micro-level. Drawing on original interview material, we argue that this two-level model and distinct set of supervisory institutions have allowed China, as a relatively late entrant into the solar energy sector, to address the growing environmental emergency within China and catch up technologically with the West.
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| 11 |
ID:
168904
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates how Russian foreign policies are shaped in a two-level interactive social game. Russian foreign policies take their cue from ingrained identity positions articulated by the state leadership and negotiated in domestic debates, but they are also informed by interaction with other states. The article explains the shift in Russian policies away from pragmatic cooperation with the West in Syria from autumn 2015 onwards. While the Russian leadership initially sought such cooperation, the prominence of anti-Western discourse in Russia following the crisis in Ukraine as well as the West's rejection of Russia in this period spurred Russia to act independently in Syria.
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| 12 |
ID:
167559
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates how Russian foreign policies are shaped in a two-level interactive social game. Russian foreign policies take their cue from ingrained identity positions articulated by the state leadership and negotiated in domestic debates, but they are also informed by interaction with other states. The article explains the shift in Russian policies away from pragmatic cooperation with the West in Syria from autumn 2015 onwards. While the Russian leadership initially sought such cooperation, the prominence of anti-Western discourse in Russia following the crisis in Ukraine as well as the West's rejection of Russia in this period spurred Russia to act independently in Syria.
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| 13 |
ID:
167564
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| Summary/Abstract |
The three decades following Stalin’s death in 1953 witnessed a dramatic expansion in Soviet tourism to the other countries of the European socialist bloc. Youth tourism in particular was an important feature of efforts to build friendlier and more durable links with the satellite states at the grassroots level. However, the prospects for long-term success in this endeavour were continually hampered by Soviet concerns about the dangers of interaction, and as the years passed, the economic benefits of tourist travel rather than the initial goal of building solidarity were accorded priority.
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| 14 |
ID:
168909
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| Summary/Abstract |
The three decades following Stalin’s death in 1953 witnessed a dramatic expansion in Soviet tourism to the other countries of the European socialist bloc. Youth tourism in particular was an important feature of efforts to build friendlier and more durable links with the satellite states at the grassroots level. However, the prospects for long-term success in this endeavour were continually hampered by Soviet concerns about the dangers of interaction, and as the years passed, the economic benefits of tourist travel rather than the initial goal of building solidarity were accorded priority.
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