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ID:
171892
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper theoretically and empirically investigates whether acquaintance networks influence the deviation of land rent from the reference point advanced by Hart and Moore. The coefficient of variance and the range of land rent are used to represent the degree of deviation from the reference point. Based on village‐level data from the 2015 China Household Finance Survey, the estimated results indicate that land rent between acquaintances is more likely to significantly deviate from the reference point. Although rental transactions are conducted between acquaintances, larger deviations from the reference are also associated with a longer time to close deals. Our analysis using household‐level data further supports our findings, indicating that land rental markets embedded in the acquaintance networks of rural China are in a transition period and have characteristics of both relational and market orientation. The policy makers should introduce more outer village lessees or other market ingredients to increase the voluntary marketization of land rentals inside acquaintance networks.
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| 2 |
ID:
182766
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper considers a modified principal-agent environment, where principals can use personalized offers based on agents' reciprocity-related information. With such information, principals can either impose stronger financial incentives or try to “trigger” agents' positive reciprocity by offering a higher fixed rate. Theory suggests that principals who believe in agents' reciprocity would personalize offers so that reciprocal agents increase their effort beyond the self-regarding benchmark. Using a lab experiment, we test the behavior of principals and agents. Our experimental market witnesses significant wage personalization when reciprocity information is available. However, agents' effort levels and principals' payoffs are lower under wage personalization, compared with the sessions where principals cannot personalize offers. Our structural analysis shows that, under wage personalization, agents expect higher fixed wages and reciprocate higher wages less. Information about agents' individual reciprocity is more correlated with the expected wages, rather than the strength of reciprocity toward higher or lower wages. Principals grant higher fixed wages to workers with lower wage expectations, but because principals cannot personalize offers effectively according to the strength of reciprocity, the performance of wage personalization is limited.
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