| Summary/Abstract |
The post-Cold-War collapse of the Soviet military-industrial complex has enabled the rapid global proliferation of nuclear weapons and fissile material, thereby escalating the possibilities of non-conventional nuclear attacks. Such attacks have become more likely with the emergence of very powerful terrorist groups like Boko Haram and others around the world. Over 1,800 metric tons of nuclear material is still stored in poorly secured facilities in more than 25 countries. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as at December 2015 had recorded in their trafficking database a total of 2,889 incidents involving losses, thefts and attempts to traffic fissile material across international borders. Boko Haram may also engage with radiological or biochemical ‘dirty bombs’, which are easier to make. With no less than 48 reported incidences of biochemical attacks since 1900, it is likely that Boko Haram may switch tactics, especially considering the lack of biochemical detection protocols in Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy and also the inconsistency in public and private sector collaboration. This new reality calls for a recalibration of Nigeria’s counterterrorism protocols to accommodate the anticipated threat. The paper thus highlights policy considerations and advocates new directions.
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