Query Result Set
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:329Hits:19953575Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search
  Hide Options
Sort Order Items / Page
ABBS, LUKE (2) answer(s).
 
SrlItem
1
ID:   173888


Hunger games: food prices, ethnic cleavages and nonviolent unrest in Africa / Abbs, Luke   Journal Article
Abbs, Luke Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract Nonviolent movements are more successful when mobilizing large and diverse numbers of participants. However, while there has been considerable research on the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns, far less is known about the initial emergence of nonviolent action. A growing literature suggests ethnic divisions may undermine the ability of activists to engage in mass nonviolent mobilization across diverse social lines. Yet many large and diverse nonviolent movements have successfully emerged in various ethnically divided societies across the world. I argue that nonviolent mobilization is made possible in ethnically polarized contexts when broader cross-cutting grievances are present as they enable local activists to widen their appeal across social lines. I focus on food price spikes as an example of a cross-cutting issue that is likely to affect consumers from different ethnic groups. The unique and symbolic nature of food price spikes facilitates nonviolent mobilization across ethnic lines and provides clear short-term incentives for many people to participate in protests against the government. Using new spatially disaggregated data on government targeted nonviolent action, I analyse grid-cell years across 41 African countries (1990–2008). I find strong evidence that food price spikes increase the likelihood of nonviolent action in politically excluded and ethnically diverse locations.
        Export Export
2
ID:   172330


Ties that bind: ethnicity, pro-government militia, and the dynamics of violence in civil war / Abbs, Luke; Clayton, Govinda ; Thomson, Andrew   Journal Article
Clayton, Govinda Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract Existing research reveals many of the ways pro-government militia (PGM) shape civil violence but overlooks how the ethno-political ties between the state and a PGM might influence these effects. We argue that co-ethnic militia (i.e., groups composed of the ruling elite’s ethnic kin) are relatively loyal irregular forces that multiply state military capacity. The greater loyalty of co-ethnic groups mitigates principal–agent problems but further polarizes ethnic communities, and as a result, co-ethnic PGMs are likely to be associated with longer and more intense civil conflict. We test this argument on a global sample of cases from 1989 to 2007 using new data capturing the ethnic ties of all PGMs. The results support our claims that co-ethnic militia are associated with more intense and longer civil conflict.
        Export Export