| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
140575
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| Edition |
1st ed.
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| Publication |
DelhI, Hindustan Publishing Corporation, 1969.
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| Description |
xi, 207p.hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 003944 | 658.4034/GHO 003944 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
082808
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1955 British Operational Research (OR) analysts attached to the British Army conducted a hypothetical study of the likely impact of nuclear weapons as they might have been deployed by Anglo-French forces in resisting the German invasion of North-East France in May-June 1940. The study formed the first major attempt by OR analysts to assess the use of nuclear weapons at the tactical level. In deriving lessons from 1940, OR analysts focused on several battlefronts where nuclear weapons could have provided relief to defending forces. Consideration was also given to a situation where the invading forces were also nuclear-equipped. As this paper demonstrates, valuable insights were gained from the events of 1940 on the deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons. However, in neglecting the wider strategic environment, OR analysts failed to consider the possibility that a nuclear land battle fought in Europe between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Pact could precipitate a strategic nuclear exchange
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| 3 |
ID:
176965
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| 4 |
ID:
040921
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| Publication |
Illionis, Richard D Irwin, Inc., 1967.
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| Description |
viii 175p.Pbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 022927 | 658.4034/GRE 022927 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
041768
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| Publication |
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970.
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| Description |
xv, 357p.Hbk
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| Series |
British Library of Business Studies
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| Standard Number |
071006750X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 005774 | 658.4034/CHE 005774 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
087147
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Operational Research (OR), commonly defined by practitioners as the application of scientific methodology to operational problems, had a distinguished record during World War II. This article examines the post-war use of OR in relation to the deployment of Britain's 1950s nuclear deterrent, the V-Bomber Force. The calculations of OR analysts are highlighted, together with the findings of their assessments which, it is argued, pointed to increasing operational restrictions in relation to the V-Force. The politicisation of OR is then highlighted and it is argued that different factions in the Polaris debate sought to control OR findings to support their cause.
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