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ID:
173152
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| Summary/Abstract |
The level of alliance cohesion is measured along the following dimensions of alliance operation: attitudinal, behavioural, and functional. However, it is insufficient to evaluate the level of cohesion only by examining how those indicators have changed over time. If it were sufficient to do so, it would presume the level of alliance cohesion would be bound to become similarly high in cases such as those of the US-Japan and US-Philippines alliances in which the commonly perceived threat is now widely and deeply entrenched. This article argues that the capabilities dimension be included in the list of indicators evaluating the level of cohesion. The US places greater emphasis on encouraging its allied partners to address specific capability gaps, foster trust, and improve jointness and interoperability with the US forces and thus contribute further to the evolution of division of alliance labour in which they take a larger role in both regional and global defense as well as cater for their own needs. The evolving division of labour that has been facilitated—and made possible—by a junior ally's enhanced capabilities has incentivized both the US and its ‘capable’ ally to work together to enhance alliance cohesion and credibility.
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| 2 |
ID:
192540
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| Summary/Abstract |
This research sheds light on the structural causes of the complex and often seemingly contradictory aspects of junior allies’ behavior in an era of global power rivalry. These relatively smaller US allies must deepen cooperation with the US to address some critical security challenges that cannot be dealt with alone, but have failed in three key ways. First, the less capable the US becomes via dwindling resources reserved for meeting allied security needs, the more likely the allied dependence on US military protection is proportionately reduced in the absence of viable alternatives. Second, China’s attempts to drive a wedge between the US and its allies compounds the perception of disunity that results in allied dependence being significantly reduced. Lastly, the smaller states have limited capacity to create a buffer to navigate the rivalry between the two larger nations. Two case studies, the US-ROK and US-Philippines alliances, indicate how junior allied behavior can be seen as contradictory to the allies’ own interests as a consequence of assuming tradeoffs that result from reacting to both major powers’ policy choices, which, in turn, undermines the ability of the smaller states to determine their own security policies.
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