| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the various deficiencies of the security agency of the Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu in terms of intelligence capacity, capability and competence to counter Harakaat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahiduun (hereafter Al-Shabaab), the militant movement fighting against the government and its external backers. Based on field-based oral and written research data in Mogadishu, the article argues that the heavy dependence of the government's National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) on various external patrons essentially makes the agency less efficient and effective than Al-Shabaab's intelligence agency, the Amniyat. Looking at the internal dynamics of the government and its rival insurgency movement offers fresh anthropological insights into how the Amniyat is more dynamic than the government's intelligence agency. In spite of its internal faults and failures, the Federal Government has become stuck in an externally-imposed security architecture envisioned by the so-called ‘partners’. This has made the NISA far behind the Amniyat in terms of security provision because both opposing security agencies pursue different methods to broadcast their power and presence. Delving deeper into the inner workings of the security institutions of the NISA and the Amniyat demonstrates that the performances and practices of the two intelligence agencies reflect the acute failure that inherently characterises the government security sector.
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