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| 1 |
ID:
155069
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| Summary/Abstract |
In many international institutions, contested norms pass via voting. Although votes express national positions, dynamic vote shifts are a widespread phenomenon. Why do states sometimes change their voting stances concerning re-occurring international rules and norms? To explain observed variation, this analysis theorises the role of domestic and external windows of opportunity as well as the role of lobbying in the United Nations General Assembly. It shows that changes in government composition and changes in the text of re-occurring international rules and norms matter. Yet, whilst resourceful actors more likely change their voting stance after having successfully negotiated text changes, less powerful states are more likely to shift voting stances in response to third party lobbying.
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| 2 |
ID:
155063
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Vietnam War exacerbated the already tense relationship between Charles de Gaulle and Lyndon B. Johnson; and Franco–American relations reached a nadir in winter 1966–1967 when de Gaulle vetoed a proposed visit to Hanoi by Jean Sainteny, a former colonial official, who Washington had desired to probe North Vietnam’s position. This analysis adds a new wrinkle to the story. Building on research for Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam (2012), the author reveals that French knowledge of only the Polish version of that peace initiative’s failure, fully blaming the Americans, further soured de Gaulle’s view of Johnson’s handling of the war and American sincerity in seeking peace. The analysis also unveils a new dimension of Henry Kissinger’s involvement in Vietnam diplomacy—prior to the Nixon White House—missing from earlier accounts.
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| 3 |
ID:
155065
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| Summary/Abstract |
This analysis examines NATO’s tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Cold War both for their perceived deterrent value against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and as potential war fighting weapons. Within this debate lay questions related to extended deterrence, security guarantees, regional or theatre conflict, and escalatory potential. A central tenet that emerged in Europe was that nuclear weapons needed emplacement on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members to make deterrence more tangible. It raised huge questions of consultation. Once the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles, the credibility of American readiness to use nuclear weapons in defence of its allies came into question. European alternatives and different consultation mechanisms to facilitate nuclear use became central to intra-NATO relations. Actively debated across NATO, they directly concerned above all the United States, Britain, and France—the nuclear weapons states in the NATO area—and West Germany, the potential main battleground in a Warsaw Pact invasion. Although dormant in NATO since the end of the Cold War, these issues will likely see revisiting in both Europe and other regional trouble spots.
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| 4 |
ID:
155064
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| Summary/Abstract |
The role of Great Powers in processes of secession and recognition has attracted increasing attention from scholars in recent years. This analysis examines how Britain rallied international opposition to the November 1983 unilateral declaration of independence [UDI] of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” [TRNC]. The British Government tried hard to prevent the UDI. Once it occurred, Britain led efforts to condemn the move. It resulted in United Nations Security Council Resolution 541, which declared the TRNC illegal and called on states not to recognise it. As well as exploring the diplomacy behind the counter-secession efforts, this examination also answers a long-standing question as to whether any countries aside from Turkey ever recognised the TRNC. It also challenges the widely held view amongst Greek Cypriots that Britain invariably supports the Turkish Cypriots on the Cyprus Problem.
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| 5 |
ID:
155068
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| Summary/Abstract |
The West has shunned the Islamic Republic of Iran for most of the past 38 years. To neutralise the very negative impact that this situation has had on the country’s economy and political isolation, Iran has turned to the East, in particular to China and Russia, a change in orientation despite Iran’s traditional preference for the West. Since the Soviet Union’s demise, Iran and Russia have steadily been expanding co-operation in trade, regional security, nuclear technology, military issues, and oil and natural gas exploration and marketing. Yet both Powers have cautiously approached one other. The degree of expansion or contraction in co-operation has depended considerably on whether relations between the West and Russia have been amicable or hostile. Historically speaking, Great Power rivalry over Iran has worked better for Tehran than when these Powers have taken a unified policy, as in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
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| 6 |
ID:
155067
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| Summary/Abstract |
President Barack Obama’s foreign policy has confounded critics from both the left and right in American politics. This analysis argues that this is because Obama’s foreign policy exhibits affinities with the least prominent of the four traditions of American foreign policy identified by Walter Russell Mead: the Jeffersonian tradition. In contrast to the more prominent Wilsonian and Hamiltonian traditions, the Jeffersonian tradition exhibits more introverted tendencies that seek to perfect and protect rather than export the virtues of the Republic. The Jeffersonian understanding of foreign policy is, in Walter Lippman’s phrase, primarily the “shield of the republic.” This analysis tracks the influence and implications of this perspective through examination of the Obama Administration’s approach to two prominent foreign policy challenges after 2008: intervention in Libya and the ongoing Syrian crisis.
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| 7 |
ID:
155062
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| Summary/Abstract |
This analysis focuses on the Canadian–American relationship during the Second World War. Between 1940 and 1946, both Allies held over 400,000 German prisoners of war [POWs] in hundreds of camps spread across their territory. The presence of these “Hitler’s soldiers” on the North American continent quickly became an issue of close collaboration between the two Powers. Exploring the complex intra-Allied negotiations and collaboration via the Canada–United States exchanges on German POWs, this exegesis challenges the general argument that as a middle Power, Canada found exclusion from Allied policy-making on POWs. Although differences existed between the two detention systems, Canadian and American policy-makers consistently viewed the war captivity as an intra-Allied object of concern. They exchanged security information, shared their experience, and organised visits in camps. This collaboration indicates that Ottawa played a pivotal role in German POW captivity.
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| 8 |
ID:
155066
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article provides a comparative analysis of the sales of the Trident nuclear missile system to Britain by the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan administrations. Both governments viewed the Anglo–American nuclear partnership as a tool within their wider foreign policy kit and utilised the sale of Trident to influence British defence policy. For these reasons, each administration saw the Trident sale as part of an Anglo–American transactional defence relationship. This exegesis deepens understanding of the United States perspective on Anglo–American nuclear co-operation. Moreover, it is relevant to current debates on the replacement of Trident because it highlights the ramifications of Britain’s technical dependence and raises questions about the concessions that may have been made, or will need to be made, to the United States in exchange for the latter’s assistance with replacement.
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